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Screening individuals for concealed knowledge has traditionally been the 
purview of professional interrogators investigating a crime. But the ability to detect 
when a person is hiding important information would be of high value to many 
other fields and functions. This dissertation proposes design principles for and 
reports on an implementation and empirical evaluation of a non-invasive, 
automated system for human screening. The screening system design (termed an 
automated screening kiosk or ASK) is patterned after a standard interviewing 
method called the Concealed Information Test (CIT), which is built on theories 
explaining psychophysiological and behavioral effects of human orienting and 
defensive responses. As part of testing the ASK proof of concept, I propose and 
empirically examine alternative indicators of concealed knowledge in a CIT. 
Specifically, I propose kinesic rigidity as a viable cue, propose and instantiate an 
automated method for capturing rigidity, and test its viability using a traditional CIT 
experiment. I also examine oculomotor behavior using a mock security screening 
experiment using an ASK system design. Participants in this second experiment 
packed a fake improvised explosive device (IED) in a bag and were screened by an 
ASK system. Results indicate that the ASK design, if implemented within a highly 
controlled framework such as the CIT, has potential to overcome barriers to more 






The most difficult type of information to obtain is often that which is 
intentionally kept hidden. Yet hidden information is often the most valuable. The 
perceived ability to successfully conceal information motivates individuals to hide 
poor performance, commit fraud, and even engage in acts of terrorism. For decades 
Bernie Madoff successfully concealed the fact that his financial service was secretly 
a Ponzi scheme—resulting in a price tag of over $64 billion (Graybow, 2009). No one 
on board the aircraft knew Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab had smuggled explosives 
aboard, which act nearly cost the lives of 289 individuals (United States of America 
vs. Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, 2010).  
The discovery of high-value, purposely concealed information is an 
important topic in many fields. Financial fraud detection usually involves searching 
for deliberately concealed data. Criminal forensics and criminal investigations often 
include searching for evidence that was deliberately hidden. Cyber security involves 
seeking purposely concealed malware and other concealed intrusions (Morales, 
2008).  
Hidden information is of interest to more than just criminal detection 
organizations. Retail establishments seek ways to unveil each customer’s 
willingness to pay. Employee recruitment and evaluation teams desire to discover 




management personnel need methods of screening people for potential security 
threats. 
1.1 Security Screening Methods 
Though the theory, protocol, and system design in this paper may be applied 
to many of these contexts, I chose to focus much of this study on human security 
screening. In this paper I refer to security screening as the evaluation and 
containment of potential human threats, prior to physical entry of a building, 
territory, or area of interest. I refer to security screening methods as tactics 
employed to generate an evaluation. Metal detector scans, official documentation 
evaluations, and simple questioning techniques are common examples of security 
screening methods.  
Screening methods have become increasingly costly, time-consuming, and 
intrusive; yet, performance levels remain considerably lower than desired (Bandyk, 
2010). The United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) processed over 
267 million incoming border crossings in 2008 (Bureau of Transportation Statistics, 
2008), but estimated a 71.1% failure rate when it came to apprehending “major 
violations” of laws, rules, and regulations (Department of Homeland Security, 2009). 
Air passenger violations were reportedly apprehended only 25% of time 
(Department of Homeland Security, 2009). Anecdotal evidence indicates that the 
problem is not simply overlooking minor infractions: DHS undercover personnel 




airport succeeded in 90% of trials, and failure rates were as high as 70% during 
similar penetration tests at Los Angeles and Chicago airports (Mosk, Hill, & Fleming, 
2010). Given the enormity of the consequences of poor security screening, a 
promising research opportunity exists to improve these methods. 
In the extant literature, several studies have addressed improving security 
screening methods. Studies have investigated improving operational design to more 
efficiently allocate resources (Cavusoglu, Koh, & Raghunathan, 2010; Lee & 
Jacobson, 2011; Menneer, Cave, & Donnelly, 2009; Wang & Zhuang, 2011), 
enhancing sensors for detecting illicit items (Fainberg, 1992; S.-W. Park, Yuk, Ryu, 
Kim, & Yi, 2006; Vassiliades, Evans, Kaufman, Chan, & Downes, 2008), and 
improving decision support and screener decision making tools (Jensen, Lowry, 
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2010; Jensen, Lowry, Burgoon, & Nunamaker Jr., 2011; G. 
Park & DeShon, 2010; Twyman, Jenkins, Carl, & Nunamaker Jr., 2011).  
Though these streams of security screening research have greatly 
contributed to practice, they stop short of addressing as-yet unknown threats. 
Namely, current screening systems tend to be reactionary in nature: they are 
designed and redesigned to detect only that which has already been discovered 
through prior experience (Nakanishi, 2008). Accordingly, they do not include 
mechanisms for preventing threats that have yet to be discovered. In this area, 
human security screening lags behind related research areas such as fraud detection 
(Cecchini, Aytug, Koehler, & Pathak, 2010; Holton, 2009; Humpherys, Moffitt, Burns, 




prevention (Green, Raz, & Zviran, 2007; Ryu & Rhee, 2008), and cyberterrorism 
prevention research (Hansen, Lowry, Meservy, & McDonald, 2007) that have begun 
developing techniques that could be used to avert illegal or undesirable actions that 
have not been previously committed.  
1.2 Veracity Assessment Tools for Illuminating Unknown Threats 
This inability to screen for the unexpected can be addressed by integrating 
elements of veracity assessment research with security screening protocols. In 
recent years, some IS research has proposed advanced tools for veracity assessment 
(e.g., D. C. Derrick, Elkins, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Zeng, 2010; Fukuda, 2001; 
Meservy et al., 2005; Twyman, Elkins, & Burgoon, 2011; Twyman, Moffitt, Burgoon, 
& Marchak, 2010). Though few studies have targeted security screening specifically, 
research results on these tools suggest the possibility of recognizing threats on a 
more abstract level. For instance, natural language processing tools have been 
designed to predict the likelihood of financial fraud, even though the exact nature of 
the fraud may be undefined (Glancy & Yadav, 2011; Humpherys, et al., 2011). In 
addition to linguistic analyses, IS veracity assessment research has investigated 
other tools such as body movement analyses, vocalic feature analyses, pupillometry, 
thermal measurement, and noncontact cardiorespiratory measures (D. C. Derrick, et 
al., 2010; Meservy, Jensen, Kruse, Burgoon, Nunamaker, et al., 2005). This research 
has demonstrated the potential value of certain tools, showing that systems can 




However, these tools cannot be equally applied to every situation. Cues to 
deception are likely to be heavily influenced by many factors. Psychology, criminal 
justice, and communication research on deception detection demonstrates that 
when it comes to screening, the protocol used to assess veracity can be just as 
important as the cue or measurement (Hartwig, Granhag, Stromwall, & Kronkvist, 
2006; Levine, Shaw, & Shulman, 2010). The effectiveness of a given tool for 
measuring veracity is influenced by factors such as interviewer skill (Iacono, 2008) 
and crime-related knowledge (E. Elaad, 1997), the level of synchrony in the 
communication (Humpherys, et al., 2011; Zhou, Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Twitchell, 
2004), and even the type of questions asked (J. K. Burgoon, Buller, Ebesu, & 
Rockwell, 1994; Moffitt, 2011). Thus, a natural step forward in this field of research 
is to design and test screening systems that are rooted in procedures and theories 
that are well-established and generalizable. To establish validity and reliability in 
automated human security screening, methods and processes need to be researched 
in conjunction with effective technologies.  
To address these opportunities in security screening research, this study 
proposes and evaluates an automated security screening system design that is 
based on a modified version of a successful screening technique called the 
Concealed Information Test (CIT; Lykken, 1974). Rather than scanning for the threat 
itself, the system searches for hidden threats at a more abstract level, by asking each 
individual several questions while recording psychophysiological and behavioral 




Raskin & Honts, 2002). This system design is similar in concept to behavior-based 
computer virus detection, which analyzes the behavior of programs looking for 
suspicious activity rather than only looking for specific virus signatures (e.g., Kim, 
Shin, & Pillai, 2011; Morales, 2008; O'Kane, Sezer, & McLaughlin, 2011). 
A well-designed screening system for detecting intentionally concealed 
knowledge could be useful in any situation where the discovery of such information 
would be valuable. For instance, criminal investigations can benefit from knowing 
which suspects possess crucial information. Job applications could be accompanied 
by an objective integrity evaluation.  Retraining courses could be personalized for 
corporate policy topics for which employees prefer not to reveal ignorance or non-
compliance. Physical building security could be enhanced. These considerations 
inspire the research question: 
What are design principles for a system and protocol for automated screening 
of individuals for concealed knowledge? 
 
As the ensuing discussion will show, the investigation into this research 
question revealed that non-traditional indicators of concealed information are 
needed. I investigate three potential indicators, two of which are novel to CIT and 
deception detection research. Thus, in addition to outlining a screening system 
design, a secondary research question for this work is as follows: 
How can measurement of kinesic, oculomotor, and vocalic behaviors serve as 





The remainder of this dissertation proceeds as follows: existing standard 
interviewing techniques are reviewed, and justification is provided for using the CIT 
as a foundation for this study and system design. Following this is a narrative that 
introduces and explains how oculomotor (eye movement-based) patterns, body 
movement rigidity, and response time can serve as indicators of concealed 
information. The experiments used to investigate alternative indicators and the 
potential of a CIT-based screening system are then reviewed and results reported. 
Included in the discussion of the final experiment is a description of an implemented 
automated screening system termed an automated screening kiosk (ASK), which 
was evaluated in the experiment. The final experiment involved having participants 
build a mock improvised explosive device (IED) and try to smuggle it through a 
security screening station that implemented the ASK. Following the reported results 
of these experiments is a discussion of the implications for research and practice 
together with future research directions. 
1.3 Background on Standardized Interviewing Techniques 
As noted, studies investigating veracity assessment and screening tools 
illuminate the value of a standardized screening process (Hartwig, et al., 2006; 
Humpherys, et al., 2011; Levine, et al., 2010; Moffitt, 2011). Standardized 
interviewing techniques such as the CIT have historically been used to assess the 




illicit activity by asking particular questions and measuring physiological and 
behavioral responses (Gamer, Verschuere, Crombez, & Vossel, 2008; MacLaren, 
2001). Several standardized interpersonal screening techniques are currently used 
regularly by practitioners, the most common of which include the Control Question 
Test (CQT), the Behavioral Analysis Interview (BAI), and the CIT (Vrij, 2008). I 
briefly overview these here; Vrij’s (2008) compilation contains a more in-depth 
review. 
The CQT is currently the most commonly used interviewing technique for 
veracity assessment (Vrij, 2008). The CQT takes several hours to complete, and 
requires a high level of skill on the part of the interviewer to obtain valid results. 
The interviewer in the main phase of the CQT asks several control questions that 
every person is likely to lie about (e.g., “Have you ever taken something that does 
not belong to you?”), and several questions that are directly relevant to the crime or 
illicit act (e.g., “Did you steal the car?”). Before doing this, the interviewer must lead 
the examinee to believe that admitting to such a question would necessarily show 
that he or she is the type of person who would commit the crime or illicit act that is 
the subject of the CQT. This manipulation is necessary to ensure that an innocent 
examinee will experience more arousal when presented with these control 
questions than about crime-relevant questions, whereas a guilty examinee will 
experience equal or more arousal during the relevant question (Meijer & 
Verschuere, 2010; Raskin & Honts, 2002).  Though commonly used in practice, the 




(Ben-Shakhar, 2002; Iacono, 2000; Lykken, 1998; Meijer & Verschuere, 2010; Vrij, 
2008)—most notably the United States National Research Council (2003).  Among 
the major research concerns cited are the inability to measure objectively whether 
the interviewer has successfully manipulated the interviewee (Fiedler, Schmid, & 
Stahl, 2002; Iacono, 2008; Lykken, 1998), and uncertainty as to whether 
psychophysiological indicators can reliably distinguish between a guilty person’s 
fear of being caught and an innocent person’s fear of false detection (Meijer & 
Verschuere, 2010). 
The BAI is a method of interviewing sponsored primarily by a single 
practitioner group (John E. Reid  & Associates, 2011). It is probably the second most 
common interviewing technique used in the United States (Vrij, 2008). The BAI 
interviewer asks a series of 15-16 standard questions designed to elicit certain 
verbal and non-verbal responses. Developers of the BAI posit that truth-tellers and 
deceivers should react differently to these questions as a result of differing attitudes 
toward the crime or event in question (Horvath, Jayne, & Buckley, 1994; Inbau, Reid, 
Buckley, & Jayne, 2001). For instance, during what is termed the “motive” question 
(e.g., “Why do you think someone stole the car?”), guilty examinees are expected to 
show posture shifts or foot bouncing as a means of reducing a high level of anxiety 
which purportedly should not be present in innocent examinees. Aside from an 
initial positive evaluation (Horvath, et al., 1994), little direct scientific investigation 
validates the BAI. A few direct investigations challenge the validity of the BAI (Blair 




studies has been called into question (Horvath, Blair, & Buckley, 2008). The most 
recent BAI investigation suggests that portions of the BAI do show promise 
(Horvath, et al., 2008). The mechanisms underlying the BAI remain underexplored, 
and much more research is needed before validity of the BAI can be established 
(Blair & Kooi, 2004; Horvath, et al., 2008). 
As noted, the CIT is an interviewing technique used to determine whether an 
examinee is concealing knowledge (Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Lykken, 1959). The 
CIT actually predates the CQT: the concept was first described in 1908 by 
Münsterberg (Münsterberg, 1908). But research on the concept did not move 
forward until much later when Lykken labeled it and proposed it as a more viable 
alternative to contemporary techniques. In a standard CIT, an interviewer recites 
several prepared questions or statements regarding the activity (e.g., crime) in 
question. Prepared with each question are several plausible answers, collectively 
called a foil, which are also recited by the interviewer. For instance, if the activity in 
question is the theft of a vehicle, one of the CIT questions might read: “If you were 
involved in the theft of the vehicle, you would know the color of the car that was 
stolen. Repeat after me these car colors.” The interviewer would then verbally recite 
each item in the associated foil, which would consist of about four to six colors, only 
one of which would be the correct color. The examinee is usually asked to either 
repeat the items or reply with a verbal “yes” or “no” after each item is spoken by the 
interviewer. Once the examinee has spoken, the interviewee and interviewer sit in 




Though not as commonly used by practitioners as the CQT or BAI, 
researchers widely consider the CIT to be the most scientifically valid approach 
(Ben-Shakhar & Elaad, 2003; Fiedler, et al., 2002; Iacono & Lykken, 1997; National 
Research Council, 2003).  Unlike the CQT, BAI, and similar techniques, the CIT does 
not rely heavily on the capabilities of the interviewer. Instead, the CIT interviewer 
plays only a minor role—requiring little to no skill. Moreover, an innocent person’s 
fear of detection should not affect the outcome in a CIT, because responses to all 
items should be consistent whether their general arousal level is low or high. For 
instance, if the relevant (correct) response to the example CIT question above was 
“blue,” an innocent person’s fear of being falsely classified should create no different 
effect than when the response is “green,” “white,” or any other option, simply 
because they have no knowledge of which option is correct. 
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High Used in the United 




(John E. Reid  & 
Associates, 2011) 
*Exact time is a function of how many questions are used (usually between 3 and 6). 
**Estimated from a subjective review of polygraph examiner practitioner promotional material. 
***Lower bound estimate based on amount of time required to minimally ask and respond to all BAI 




2. HOW THE CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST CAN BE 
ADAPTED FOR SCREENING SYSTEMS 
Whereas aspects of each interviewing technique have potential application to 
automated screening systems, the CIT has several unique advantages that made it 
the clear choice for the protocol portion of an automated screening system design. 
First, it requires the least time and little interviewer skill or intervention, which not 
only helps to control for interviewer effects but also makes automation easier. The 
CIT also generates the strongest within-subjects baseline for comparison.  
Additional advantages of the CIT stem from its foil structure and length. Each 
foil is self-contained; a system or evaluator can use a single foil to make a judgment. 
However, the use of multiple foils reduces the probability of false detects, as long as 
each foil is associated with a question that is central to the hidden knowledge in 
question (Carmel, Dayan, Naveh, Raveh, & Ben-Shakhar, 2003). The low ratio of 
relevant to non-relevant options within each foil (usually between 1:3 and 1:6) 
creates a strong baseline that is both person- and question-specific. The CIT process 
requires much less time compared to other techniques such as the BAI. Evaluators 
can complete several foils in a matter of minutes, whereas alternative techniques 
can last hours. 
The veracity assessment literature offers three main criticisms of the CIT. 
These limitations have been reported to be the main reasons the CIT has not 




cases revealed that only a small percentage of criminal cases are reported to meet 
the necessary criteria (Podlesny, 1993, 2003). To the extent these concerns can be 
addressed, the CIT could be applied more generally. However, it should be noted 
that weaknesses exist in the method Podlesny used in the above-cited studies 
(Meijer & Verschuere, 2010), and in spite of these challenges, Japan has widely 
adopted this technique for investigations (Hira & Furumitsu, 2002; Nakayama, 
2002).  Still, these criticisms remain the main arguments against wider adoption. 
First, the preparation phase for the CIT is more time-consuming and 
complicated compared to alternative interviewing techniques. Critical foil items 
have to be designed from a pool of information that is known and knowable only by 
the perpetrator of the illicit act. This process can be difficult and sometimes it is 
impossible to identify enough usable items for testing. When critical foil items are 
identified, a lack of familiarity to innocent parties should be established through 
pretesting, and non-critical foil items must be pretested as well, all of which can be 
too costly for a single investigation. However, the nature of human screening is often 
such that hundreds or sometimes thousands of examinees could undergo the same 
test in a given location and context, minimizing the relative cost of preparation.  
The second criticism is the requirement that guilty knowledge be possessed 
by only the guilty party, or innocent persons will be improperly accused (Bradley, 
MacLaren, & Carle, 1996). In security screening, it is plausible that an individual 
may know of a specific crime in progress, even though he or she is not directly 




difficulty.  The National Research Council suggests that this may be addressed by 
treating the response variables more on a scale rather than as a dichotomy 
(National Research Council, 2003). Their suggestion rests on the assumption that 
guilty knowledge will be more poignant with the responsible party than with a 
witness—an assumption that needs further investigation (Gamer, 2010). 
The third criticism of the CIT is similar to the second. For an orienting 
response to occur, a reasonably strong certainty must exist that the critical items 
chosen for CIT foils have a high degree of personal significance in the mind of the 
guilty suspect; otherwise, the difference in response between guilty and innocent 
suspects will not be as diagnostic (Carmel, et al., 2003; Gati & Ben-Shakhar, 1990). 
Ensuring this link is especially difficult when little direct information about the 
crime or event is known, or when a large amount of time has lapsed between the 
event and the investigation (Honts, 2004). In a security screening scenario, this 
concern is minimized. The particulars of the event(s) are well understood, because 
they are pre-specified. For instance, examinees are usually aware of a list of banned 
items for which they are being screened. Time is unlikely to be a concern, because in 
screening scenarios the malicious event is in progress (e.g., smuggling) or is 
intended (e.g., theft) rather than a distant memory; thus, the event is sure to have 
personal significance to a guilty examinee. 
Aside from these criticisms, a practical challenge exists in using the CIT or 
any of the standard interviewing techniques as the basis for a screening system. The 




must be strapped on or otherwise physically connected to the examinee. These 
invasive sensors require human intervention and monitoring, which requires 
additional time and undermines some of the benefits of automation. To the extent a 
CIT system design could overcome these challenges, its usefulness in discovering 
hidden information can be extended not only to security screening, but also to 
applications ranging from internal auditing to anti-terrorism. 
  
2.1 Design Principles for Automated Screening for Concealed 
Guilty Knowledge 
Several general design principles for an automated screening system and 
process for discovering purposely concealed knowledge can be derived from the 
previous review. The design principles I propose for such systems follow: 
1. Identify appropriate stimuli that represent the concealed knowledge in 
question. Ensure there is reasonably strong certainty that the 
representation has relatively high personal significance for a person who 
is concealing such knowledge. 
2. Identify irrelevant stimuli that arouse the same baseline level of orienting 
and defensive responses (discussed in the next section). 
3. Develop several foils consisting of relevant and irrelevant stimuli in a 
one-to-many ratio.  




distractions are at a minimum, including but not limited to human 
distractions. 
5. During foil presentation, automatically capture human indicators of the 
orienting and/or defensive responses. 
6. Apply categorization algorithms to the collected data to assess concealed 
knowledge. 
 
While each design principle is an important component of an automated 
screening system design, this research focuses mostly on advancing principles 4 and 
5. However, the system design proposed later in this document will be evaluated 




3. THEORETICAL FOUNDATION FOR THE AUTOMATED 
DETECTION OF CONCEALED KNOWLEDGE USING THE 
CONCEALED INFORMATION TEST (CIT) 
This section explains the theoretical foundation of the CIT and how the CIT 
can be used to detect concealed knowledge about adverse events, including the 
presence of those that may not have been identified as yet. The theory underlying 
the CIT has traditionally centered on the orienting response. In extending CIT 
research to automated screening for hidden knowledge applications, I also 
incorporate defensive response theory and related theories used in veracity 
assessment literature.  
3.1 The Orienting Reflex  
The CIT draws on the orienting reflex, which is the autonomic movement of 
attention toward novel or personally significant stimuli (Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 
1963). The level of stimulus novelty is a function of the degree to which it matches 
(or does not match) stimuli that precede it in a given context (Gati & Ben-Shakhar, 
1990). The level of personal significance is a function of the degree to which a 
stimulus matches one’s cognitive representation of a given item of relevant 
information (Gati & Ben-Shakhar, 1990). When an individual’s autonomic system 
registers a novel or personally significant stimulus, the sympathetic portion of the 




so that the individual is ready to adapt or react to the stimulus (National Research 
Council, 2003; Pavlov, 1927; Sokolov, 1963; Verschuere, Crombez, Clercq, & Koster, 
2004). 
The orienting reflex is an autonomic response that creates measurable 
physiological effects (Ambach, Bursch, Stark, & Vaitl, 2010; Gamer, et al., 2008; 
Lykken, 1974). This readiness to adapt includes physiological changes such as 
variance in heart rate, skin sweatiness, pupil dilation, and respiration (Ambach, et 
al., 2010; Eitan Elaad & Ben-Shakhar, 2009; Lykken, 1959). Stimuli that have 
stronger relevance or “signal value” (Lykken, 1974, p. 728) such as an out-of-place 
object or hearing one’s own name (Cherry, 1953) produce a stronger orienting 
reflex (Bernstein, 1979; Maltzman, 1979). With repeated presentations of stimuli, 
the magnitude of the reflex decreases as a function of the corresponding decrease in 
novelty and personal significance (Sokolov, 1963). Figure 1 depicts the process of 





















As noted, the CIT uses several multiple choice questions, with only one 
relevant (i.e., correct) answer per question. Knowledge regarding the correct 
alternative serves as additional “signal value,” which activates the orienting reflex 
much more strongly than that seen in irrelevant (no “signal value”) alternatives 
(Lykken, 1974). In the CIT, two basic outcomes are compared. The physiological 
responses that follow presentation of a relevant stimulus are compared to the 
physiological responses that follow presentation of the several irrelevant stimuli 
(Gamer, et al., 2008). 
The key to successful execution of the CIT is thus to identify stimuli that are 
relevant only to the guilty party. Traditionally, the knowledge in question is related 
directly to a crime or similar event, which knowledge usually activates guilt, fear, or 
similar arousal when accessed. These traditional applications helped inspire the 
original technique label—the Guilty Knowledge Test (GKT) (Ben-Shakhar, Bar-Hillel, 
& Kremnitzer, 2002; Lykken, 1959, 1974; Podlesny, 1993). However, the CIT has 
also been used successfully to uncover hidden knowledge unassociated with highly 
charged emotions, such as hiding knowledge of a playing card (Fukuda, 2001; 
Gamer, Bauermann, Stoeter, & Vossel, 2007). The phrase “concealed information” 
rather than “guilty knowledge” has become the phrasing of choice, even though 
most practical applications of the CIT still focus on knowledge highly associated 




3.2 When Stimuli are Threatening 
Though it has received somewhat less attention in CIT research, there is 
another mechanism examinees usually exhibit called the defensive response. 
Whereas the orienting reflex can occur with any stimulus of sufficient novelty or 
personal significance, the defensive response is a reaction only to stimuli perceived 
to be aversive or threatening. This reaction includes physiological and behavioral 
changes. 
The defensive response was initially coined the “fight-or-flight” behavior in 
the early 20th century (Walter B. Cannon, 1929). The defensive response can be 
broken up into at least two phases—an initial defensive reflex followed by defensive 
behaviors. When threatening stimuli are first perceived, an initial sympathetic 
nervous system activation occurs—driving a defensive physiological reaction 
thought to help the individual assess the threat and determine the appropriate 
action to take (Sokolov, 1963; Verschuere, et al., 2004). Many of the physiological 
changes associated with this initial defensive reflex are similar to the orienting reflex 
(e.g. a sudden increase in skin sweatiness) (Verschuere, et al., 2004), though there 
are differences in cardiovascular response. In CIT research, this reflex stage of the 
defensive response is thought to amplify many of the physiological measures of the 
orienting reflex.  
The initial defensive reflex transitions into behaviors designed to escape or 




term these defensive behaviors to distinguish them from the defensive reflex. 
Behaviors that stem from responding to a threat are not necessarily autonomic, and 
may be driven by subconscious or conscious mechanisms. Defensive behaviors are 
driven by a perceived threat, and therefore can be different than behavioral 
reactions to stimuli perceived to be non-threatening (Ambach, Stark, Peper, & Vaitl, 
2008). Though absent from CIT research, these defensive behaviors have been the 
focus of much research in veracity assessment literature. Veracity assessment 
literature has documented various “fight or flight” tactics individuals consciously or 
subconsciously employ when an important deception is under threat of discovery. 
For instance, a tendency to freeze or become more rigid has been documented (Vrij, 
Semin, & Bull, 1996). Other behaviors include avoiding direct answers, attempting 
to distract the evaluator, and/or controlling message content and nonverbal 
behavior so as to appear truthful (DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O'Brien, 1988). 
Deception detection literature has shown that sometimes these defensive behaviors 
themselves can indicate deception. Sometimes these defensive behaviors are 
insufficient or unsuccessful, and cues indicating a deception “leak” out thereby 














Figure 2. Depiction of defensive responding. 
 
I propose that defensive behaviors can be valuable input for discovering 
concealed knowledge. In the CIT, aversive or threatening stimuli are those foil items 
that have potential to expose concealed knowledge about the incident that the 
individual wishes to keep hidden. When presented with the aversive stimuli, 
individuals should exhibit defensive behaviors designed to escape or combat the 
threat. The same stimuli should have no such effect on individuals who do not find 
the stimuli aversive. Thus, behavior modifications in a CIT can reveal hidden guilty 
knowledge. 
 
3.3 Measuring Orienting and Defensive Behavior in Screening 
Applications  
Measures of the orienting and defensive reflexes traditionally target skin 
conductance response (SCR), respiration, and heart rate (Gamer, et al., 2008). 











manual calibration and supervision—making application to security screening 
infeasible. These considerations lead us to evaluate alternative measures for 
detecting concealed knowledge. Though much recent CIT research has begun using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) or similar brain imaging techniques 
(e.g., Gamer, et al., 2007; Ganis, Rosenfeld, Meixner, Kievit, & Schendan, 2011; Hahm 
et al., 2009; Langleben et al., 2002), the procedures and measurement apparatus for 
these scenarios are even more invasive than traditional techniques, and likely would 
require even more specialized supervision. Recent research in deception detection 
has indicated that eye movement can betray deception (Douglas C. Derrick, Moffitt, 
& Nunamaker, 2011; Osher, 2007; Steptoe, Steed, Rovira, & Rae, 2010; Twyman, et 
al., 2010), and advances in eye tracking technology are such that eye movement can 
be measured non-invasively at a distance. Body movement rigidity and response 
time have likewise shown potential as cues to deception. For this study I chose eye-
movement tracking, movement tracking, and response time as non-contact, 
automated alternatives for measuring the orienting reflex and the defensive 
response to aversive stimuli. 
3.3.1 Oculomotor Orienting Behavior 
When a presented novel or significant stimulus demands visual processing, 
the eyes reflexively orient toward the stimulus. The rapid movement of the eye from 
one point of visual focus to another is termed a saccade. Saccades are the most 




orienting reflex), or they can be overt (such as when performing a visual search 
task) (Hollingworth, 2007; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989).  
 Eye-movement patterns have long been used in cognitive psychology 
research to explore both the orienting reflex and overt attention shifts 
(Hollingworth, 2007; Müller & Rabbitt, 1989; Posner, 1980), and some IS research 
has similarly begun to use eye-movement behavior as a surrogate for visual 
attention (Cyr, Head, Larios, & Pan, 2009; Djamasbi, Siegel, Skorinko, & Tullis, 2011; 
Lorigo et al., 2008). The popular spotlight theory of attention (Posner, 1980) posits 
that stimuli outside the focus of attention are processed by peripheral attention. 
Visual stimuli are first discovered by peripheral attention; if a stimulus has a 
sufficient level of significance or novelty the eyes will move toward it. Importantly, 
saccades can be either reflexive or overt (i.e., consciously controlled) (Duchowski, 
2007). To the extent saccades are reflexive they will occur before the stimulus is 
consciously identified (Posner, 1980).  
 I propose a system design that exploits this reflexive visual orienting. To do 
this I propose using visual rather than auditory CIT foils, and presenting foil items 
simultaneously rather than in a sequence. If visual foils are displayed 
simultaneously on a screen, those who are hiding knowledge about a particular 
event should be more likely to orient their initial attention reflexively, and therefore 
their eyes, toward the visual CIT item that is associated with their guilty knowledge. 
For instance, if a visual CIT foil consists of the words “bombs,” “knives,” “guns,” and 




toward the word “bombs,” as it currently should have the highest level of personal 
significance relative to the alternative items. In contrast, a person without guilty 
knowledge would be significantly less likely to orient toward the word, “bombs.” I 
thus hypothesize that 
H1. Guilty knowledge increases the likelihood that an initial saccade will be 
directed toward the critical item in a collection of simultaneously presented CIT 
foil items. 
 
As noted, orienting theory posits that over time, the orienting reflex 
diminishes in a manner corresponding to the associated decrease in novelty and/or 
personal significance. As an individual gains experience with the format of a rapid 
screening CIT, he or she could find the novelty of the stimuli diminish. Accordingly, I 
hypothesize that 
H2. Over time, stimuli representing guilty knowledge will be less likely to attract 
the initial saccade. 
3.3.2 Response Time 
An alternative measure that has been investigated in CIT literature is 
response time.  The orienting reflex may increase reaction time when an individual 
is presented with relevant stimuli (Gamer, et al., 2007), because the reorienting of 
cognitive resources (a result of the orienting reflex) causes a delay. Gronau and 




when answering Stroop-like questions regarding a mock crime (Gronau, Ben-
Shakhar, & Cohen, 2005). However, other studies successfully used reaction time in 
modified CITs (Seymour & Fraynt, 2009; Seymour, Seifert, Shafto, & Mosmann, 
2000), and one suggests it may produce discriminating power similar to the 
polygraph (Verschuere, et al., 2004). Meanwhile, the counterargument for using 
response time to discriminate concealed knowledge is that it may be easily 
consciously controlled (Gronau, et al., 2005). 
The benefit of response time in this context is that it can be measured non-
invasively and automatically. In a rapid screening context, response time may be a 
useful measure. I replicate the hypothesis of prior CIT work here: 
H3: Guilty Knowledge will increase response latency when a critical item is 
presented. 
3.3.3 Oculomotor Defensive Behavior 
 I propose that upon initial detection of the critical foil item, persons with 
guilty knowledge will exhibit defensive behavior. Upon detection of the threatening 
item, attention should orient to the perception of a threat, triggering the defensive 
response. While there are several possible defensive actions that could be taken, 
defensive response theory holds that the default defensive response to a threat is 
usually avoidance or escape (Gray, 1988). In the visual CIT design (detailed in the 
Methods section), a “safety” point is presented in the center of the screen when each 




thereby serving as the optimal point of avoidance or point of greatest safety—away 
from potential threats.  
 I thus propose that examinees with hidden guilty knowledge will focus more 
visual attention on the best point of escape—the center point of the screen. Those 
without guilty knowledge will manifest significantly less propensity to orient to this 
center point, because they will not share this inherent need for “safety.” I thus 
hypothesize that 
H4. Guilty knowledge increases time spent gazing at the safety point. 
 
Unlike the orienting reflex that diminishes with time, defensive behavior 
should remain constant as long as the examinee has reason to perceive a threat. 
Namely, a credible threat yesterday does not diminish another credible threat today. 
This is an important consideration for contexts such as security screening where 
testing may occur several times for frequent travelers. I thus hypothesize that 
H5. Guilty knowledge increases critical stimuli avoidance during repeat 
exposures. 
3.3.4 Kinesic Defensive Behavior 
Standard interviewing techniques such as the CIT use multiple sensors to help 
decrease the potential for error and the possibility of capitalizing on chance. It is 
likewise prudent in an automated human screening scenario to investigate multiple 




research in deception detection has investigated kinesic (body movement) 
correlates of veracity. Kinesic rigidity has been documented under conditions of low 
veracity. Specifically, during high-stakes deception a liar tends to exhibit fewer 
random movements, such as fewer instances of rubbing hands together or bouncing 
a leg. Expressive or illustrative movements that do occur tend to be more confined 
and seem forced, as if they are being resisted (Buller & Aune, 1987; Vrij, 1995; Vrij, 
et al., 1996).  
 There are at least two theories that have been used to explain the rigidity 
phenomenon: cognitive load theory and behavioral control theory. The next 
subsections review these theories and explore how they relate to the defensive 
response. Though the rigidity phenomenon has been explored in other research, it 
has never been explored within the context of the CIT, or an automated screening 
approach. Thus, this section explores the potential viability of rigidity as a cue to 
concealed knowledge within a CIT framework, and proposes a method for the 
automatic detection of rigidity in a CIT context.  
3.3.4.1 Cognitive Load Theory 
 Cognitive load theory proposes that lying takes more cognitive effort than 
telling the truth, and assumes that fabricating events requires more cognitive 
resources than simply recalling events (Vrij et al., 2008). Because more cognitive 
resources are allocated to creating a plausible deception, other activities, including 




allocated to body movement, fewer illustrative or communicative gestures are 
expected as a result.  
3.3.4.2 Behavioral Control Theory 
 People have motivation to hide personal knowledge related to information 
that if revealed, would lead to adverse consequences. When attention orients 
toward stimuli that represent information associated with guilty knowledge, the 
individual initiates purposeful behaviors designed to avoid potential negative 
outcomes. Consciously controlling actions in order to appear truthful is a 
phenomenon that has been termed behavioral control in the deception detection 
literature. When behavioral control can be detected, it can be an indicator of 
deception (DePaulo, et al., 1988).  
Postural rigidity during low-veracity communications is a type of behavioral 
control. Veracity assessment research has shown that the general population holds 
to a false believe that liars show increased nervousness in their body movements. 
Interestingly, while the average person believes a person shows increased body 
movement when lying, the opposite tends to be the case. A deceiver may therefore 
overtly become more rigid in an attempt to mimic their own false perception of 
what a truthful communication should look like.  
However, one study found that rigidity seems to persist even when the liar is 




may not be an exclusively overt behavior, and it may be difficult to consciously 
counter this effect. 
3.3.4.3 Cognitive Load and Behavioral Control as Defensive Responses 
Both of these theories describe defensive responding. The underlying driver 
of the defensive response is the perception of a threat. When a threat is detected, the 
sympathetic nervous system activates, moving the body to a state of hypervigilance. 
The initial stage of the defensive response has been called the “stop, look, and listen” 
reflex (Bracha, Ralston, Matsukawa, Williams, & Bracha, 2004; Gray, 1988). This 
phenomenon creates cognitive arousal above what is normal.  
Thus, from the beginning of the threat perception, cognitive load becomes a 
factor. The increase cognitive arousal continues at least as long as the threat is 
present, and those resources are used to combat the threat. One method of 
combating the threat may be overt behavioral control of movement, or a focus on 
verbal messaging that decreases resources allocated to non-verbal messaging. In 
either case, increased cognitive arousal stemming from defensive nervous system 
activation is the initial driver of the modified behavior. 
There is another, more autonomic feature of the defensive response. A 
“freeze” response is one method of combating a threat, though it is usually 
characterized as a last-resort defensive tactic. When no other option for fighting or 
escaping is apparent, individuals instinctively “freeze up,” purportedly in an effort to 




  Whether cognitive load, behavioral control, or freeze response, the 
hypothesized result is a decrease in overall body movement. This study does not 
directly compare these theories, but it is the author’s opinion that each of them may 
contribute the rigidity phenomenon to varying degrees under different contexts.  
3.3.4.4 Rigidity in the CIT 
To date, no known study has investigated rigidity in a CIT. At first glance, 
analyzing body movement in a CIT seems almost a non-sequitur. The examinee 
gives only a “yes” or “no” answer to each foil item, or repeats a word spoken by the 
interviewer, then sits in silence for several seconds. No communicative body 
movement is required during the interaction. Because the CIT requires no message 
fabrication, very few cognitive resources will be allocated to creating a believable 
verbal message. Likewise, illustrative movement will not be present, and therefore 
cannot be actively manipulated by the examinee in an attempt to appear truthful. 
This is not to say cognitive activation will be absent. To the contrary, the 
presentation of a threatening stimulus such as will occur when the correct foil 
option is presented will activate the defensive response, which increases cognitive 
activation autonomically.  
In spite of the lack of communicative movement, rigidity should still be 
present during the presentation of relevant CIT foil items. First, rigidity should 
occur as a result of the freeze response. Secondly, the simple one-word answer 




attempting to avoid detection by controlling body language. Both of these 
mechanisms may involve an unconscious or semi-conscious reaction, which may 
help to explain the findings of Vrij and colleagues (1996), who discovered that 
individuals have difficulty countering this tendency toward rigidity.   
H6: Guilty knowledge will increase body movement rigidity while a critical item 






4. A NOVEL METHOD FOR MEASURING RIGIDITY 
  Traditionally, rigidity has been measured using human coders, who 
subjectively rate the appearance of forced versus natural gesturing given the type of 
gesture and the context in which it was made. Human coding is limited to the gross 
movement that can be perceived by a given coder and it remains subject to inter-
coder error. Minute changes in movement can be imperceptible to human coders. 
The largest limitation of subjective rigidity coding is the large amount of time and 
labor cost required.  
  As an alternative to subjective human rigidity coding, I developed a novel 
automated method for measuring rigidity that is well suited for a CIT-based human 
screening system. Automated rigidity measurement via computer vision can 
introduce potential for more objective, real-time results at a much lower cost than 
human coding, allowing for more widespread application. Such an advance is critical 
if rigidity is to be included in an automated human screening system. The method 
involves using computer vision techniques (e.g., Kanaujia, Huang, & Metaxas, 2006; 
Meservy, Jensen, Kruse, Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2005) to identify face and hands in 
video and use frame-by-frame position changes of these features to calculate overall 





4.1 Skin Blob Tracking 
      To measure hand/arm movement automatically, I adopted a video analysis 
approach. For this study, I employ a skin blob tracking technique initially introduced 
to deception detection research by Meservy and colleagues (Meservy, Jensen, Kruse, 
Burgoon, & Nunamaker, 2005). To measure head movement, I employ an Active 
Shape Modeling technique (Kanaujia, et al., 2006). These techniques analyze video 
frame by frame. For each frame, the face is detected using the Viola-Jones algorithm 
(Viola & Jones, 2004). Once the face is detected, hand/arm “blobs” are identified by 
searching for areas of similar skin color. The centroid of each hand/arm blob is 






Figure 3. Depiction of skin blob tracking for face and hands. The face is 
detected and face skin color is used as a reference to detect hands. 
4.2 Active Shape Modeling for Tracking Head Movement 
 Compared to hand/arm movement, minor changes in head movement may be 
more difficult to detect in standard-definition video. An alternative procedure for 
measuring head movement is to analyze a close-up video recording of the face. For 
this study I used a software suite patented by Rutgers University called ASM Face 
Tracker (Kanaujia, et al., 2006).  The software suite tracks the 2-dimensional 
position of many points on a face in a close-up video feed in standard definition. The 




statistical models of face shapes to match identified points on an object in one image 
to points on an object in a new image. In essence, the ASM algorithm tries to match 
the statistical model parameters to the image. Thus the model can deform (e.g., 
stretch), but not beyond what would be naturally seen in a real-world object, given 
properly defined model parameters (Cootes, Taylor, Cooper, & Graham, 1995). For 
faces, this means that identified facial points must as a whole represent the image of 
a face. For instance, a point on the chin cannot be accidentally identified as 
immediately adjacent to a point on the eye (Judee K. Burgoon et al., 2010). 
 
4.3 Automating Rigidity Measurement  
To measure movement in an interview, the centroids of the head and the left 
and right hand blobs can be determined for each frame between the end of the 
interviewer utterance and the beginning of the next interviewer utterance. Each 
time the centroid of the skin blob changes positions, the total Euclidean distance 
between pre- and post-change is calculated. The sum of these distances results in a 
total distance moved for a given segment. This calculation is reflected in the 
following model: 
Ms (y2-y1)2+(x2-x1)2) 
 The same model can be used to measure movement via the close-up video 




centroids from the skin blob input. Using the output from the ASM Face Tracker 
software, a point near the center of the head was chosen for this study.      
This measure of total distance moved could then be standardized in a within-
subject, within-question manner. This is an important step to account for the fact 
that some people naturally move more than others, and the idea that variations in 
discussion topic can have a greater or lesser impact on the orienting reflex and 
defensive responding. In this study, total movement numbers are standardized 
using within-subject, within-question z-scores. 
 
4.4 Potential Limitations of Automated Rigidity Measurement 
This method of automated rigidity measurement is well suited for the CIT. A 
less controlled interviewing format introduces the possibility of one response 
naturally requiring different body language than another. For instance, smaller 
gestures may be used to communicate the concept of “little” in response to one 
question, while larger gestures may be used to communicate “big” in response to a 
separate question. Thus, simply comparing aggregated movement in an open-format 
interview without considering response context would not lead to optimal 
measurement of rigidity.  
Efforts to automatically identify and classify body movements are ongoing, 
but are currently inadequate for open-format discussions. The CIT’s controlled 




required during the interaction. In fact, the lack of communicative movement allows 
for automated, more precise measurement of rigidity—by aggregating all movement 
within each foil segment, the amount of movement during the critical foil item can 
be compared to the amount of movement during the non-critical items, providing a 






  I used two complementary methods to further this research, namely, 
laboratory experimentation and system building. First, a traditional CIT was 
conducted during an experiment that involved a mock crime. Next, I created a 
prototype of an automated security screening system to test the modified CIT 
process for rapid security screening. Finally, I conducted a laboratory experiment to 
test the hypotheses and the efficacy of the design. The second experiment involved 
having participants construct a mock improvised explosive device (IED) and then 
attempt to bring it through a screening station.  
 
5.1 Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 was part of a larger study led by Burgoon and colleagues for the 
purpose of investigating noninvasive, multimodal measurement in deception 
detection (J. Burgoon, Nunamaker, & Metaxas, 2010).  The experiment involved the 
commission of a mock crime. Participants were divided into two conditions, termed 
“Guilty” and “Innocent.” Participants in both conditions were given elaborate 
instructions on activities to accomplish as part of their participation. Activities for 
participants in the Guilty condition mirrored those in the Innocent condition, except 
that those in the Guilty condition also stole a ring out of a desk. After the activities 




examiner. Near the end of this interview, examinees underwent a CIT. Video 
recordings of these CIT portions of interviews were submitted to computer vision 
algorithms to generate body movement data for this study.  
5.1.1 Experiment 1 Participants 
Participants (N=164) were recruited from the local community, via 
advertisements in local and school newspapers, community shoppers, and craigslist. 
About three quarters of the sample (76%) were Caucasian, 9% were of Hispanic 
descent, 7% African-American, with the remainder including Asian, Native 
American, or other ethnic background. Few (8%) were students, though 40% 
reported some college and 26% reported a four-year degree. 20% reported only a 
high school education. Of the 164 enrolled participants, 134 (82%) followed 
instructions and completed the task. The remaining 18% were disqualified because 
they either did not follow instructions or confessed during the interview portion of 
the task. The average age of each participant was 39.5 (standard deviation of 14.0). 
5.1.2 Experiment 1 Task 
      Participants in the experiment were instructed to arrive at a room in an 
upper floor of an old apartment complex. A pre-recorded set of instructions was 
waiting for them. After listening to the recorded instructions and signing a consent 
form, participants left the apartment complex and walked to the nearby school.  
      Per instructions, participants reported to a room on the top floor and asked 




Carlson asked the participant to wait while he went to locate Mr. Carlson. A hidden 
webcam in the room verified the participants’ activities while they were waiting for 
the receptionist’s return. Participants in the innocent condition simply waited, while 
those in the guilty condition had been instructed to steal a diamond ring from the 
desk. Those in the guilty condition took a key from a mug on the top of a desk and 
used it to open a blue cash box in the desk drawer that was hidden underneath a 
tissue box. They removed the ring from the cash box and hid it somewhere on their 
person.  
      After his return, the confederate receptionist directed each participant to 
another room on the bottom floor. Upon arrival, each participant was told that a 
crime had occurred in the building that day and that they would be interviewed to 
assess their possible involvement in that crime. Each participant was then 
interviewed by one of four professional interviewers provided from several 
intelligence agencies with the assistance of the National Center for Credibility 
Assessment (NCCA). The interviewers were trained and experienced in criminal 
interviewing, and were familiar with the purpose and procedure involved in 
administering a Concealed Information Test.  
A CIT test consisting of three CIT foils took place near the end of the 
interview. Measurements taken during these three questions were included in the 
analyses. The three questions together with their associated relevant and irrelevant 







Table 2. CIT Foils used in Experiment 1 
Foil 
Number Question 
Words Repeated by 
Suspect 
1 “If you are the person who stole 
the ring, you are familiar with 
details of the cash box it was 
stored in.  Repeat after me these 







2 “If you are the person who stole 
the ring, you moved an object in 
the desk drawer to locate the cash 
box containing the ring.  Repeat 
after me these objects:” 
1. Notepad 
2. Telephone book 
3. Woman’s sweater 
4. Laptop bag 
5. Tissue box* 
6. Brown purse 
3 “If you are the person who stole 
the ring, you know what type of 
ring it was.  Repeat after me these 
types of rings:” 
 
1. Emerald ring 
2. Turquoise ring 
3. Amethyst ring 
4. Diamond ring* 
5. Ruby ring 
6. Gold ring 
Note: Relevant items denoted by *. 
 
Many CIT studies have participants review relevant items prior to the 
interview or testing phase to ensure salience. While this practice may provide some 
experimental control, it is not a reasonable procedure for real-world applications. 
Since a goal of this study is to investigate potential for real-world application, no 
review of relevant items was used. To ensure high validity in field settings, a CIT 




being personally significant to the real criminal (e.g., a murder weapon or an 
unexpected event that happened during the crime). 
At the end of the interview, participants were paid for their time and were 
given an additional $50 monetary reward if they successfully convinced the 
interviewer that they were innocent. This large monetary reward together with the 
realism of the experiment was important to induce motivation to succeed. At the 
end of the interview, the interviewer made a judgment as to the participant’s guilt or 
innocence. Manipulation checks ensured that the participants conducted their task 
per their condition. A final questionnaire contained these simple manipulation 
check questions, together with a question about perceived behavioral control, and 
measures of arousal and motivation levels. 
5.1.3 Experiment 1 Equipment  
      During the interview, several cameras and other measurement equipment 
were present in the room, though no equipment was actually attached or touched 
the participant, as the goal was to assess deception or guilt non-invasively. Two 
video cameras were placed directly in front of the chair each participant sat in 
during the interview. One camera captured a full-body frame, while the second 
camera concentrated on a close-up of the head. The chair had no armrests and a low 
back. No other furniture or objects were placed within reaching distance. All of this 




rest on legs during the CIT portion of the interview. In this way, hand/arm 
movement also reflects leg movement.      
 
5.2 The Automated Screening Kiosk System  
  An automated screening kiosk (ASK) system was designed as a means of 
implementing the design for a rapid screening CIT. I constructed the ASK to test the 
hypotheses and to discover the technical challenges, limitations, and unexpected 
findings from building such a system.  
  The ASK system was designed to conduct a rapid visual CIT automatically 
while simultaneously gathering oculometric, kinesic (i.e., body movement), and 
vocalic data. Though the ASK does not currently provide veracity judgments in real-
time, future versions of ASK will include real-time judgment capability. The ASK 
gathers eye movement data using an EyeTech™ TM3 eye tracking device. The ASK 
gathers kinesic and vocalic data using high-definition video recording and a studio-
quality microphone. The kinesic and vocalic data will be analyzed as part of a future 
study.  
The ASK system waits in a readiness state until it recognizes eyes within the 
field of recognition of the TM3. Once it recognizes eyes, the process begins 
automatically. A computer-generated voice gives initial instructions to the person 
being screened. ASK then guides the individual through a 10- to 15-second 9-point 








Figure 4. The EyeTech TM3 eye-tracking device. The TM3 is optimally placed 
directly below a computer monitor. 
 
Following a successful calibration, ASK uses a computer-generated voice to 
ask CIT-based questions. While a CIT question is asked, the screen remains blank 
except for a fixation marker in the center of the screen. This fixation marker serves 
to standardize the starting point for visual attention prior to the presentation of a 
foil. It also serves as the single point on the screen that is equidistant from all foil 






Figure 5. Fixation marker present when each foil question was asked. 
 
Immediately following each question, the fixation marker disappears as ASK 
simultaneously presents four boxes on the screen, equidistant from one another—
one in each quadrant of the screen. These “stimuli screens” are displayed for 7.5 
seconds each, allowing time for the participant to examine each of the four stimuli 
and respond to the question verbally with a “Yes” or “No.”  
  The entire process takes approximately two minutes. After completing the 
process, the ASK instructs the participant to proceed forward, then returns to a 
readiness state, awaiting the next participant. These features allow the system to 
operate automatically, without requirement of human intervention, except in cases 




circumstances, an ASK could be designed to alert a managing human agent, while 
simultaneously directing the traveler to a secondary screening station.  
 
5.3 Experiment 2 
The experimental design involved two treatments with eight repeated 
measures presented on two separate days (4 per day). The two treatments were 
termed Guilty and Innocent. Half of participants were assigned to the Guilty 
treatment, which involved constructing a mock IED (i.e., bomb) and packing it in a 
bag. Innocent participants also packed a bag. Both conditions involved bringing the 
packed bag through a mock building security screening station. The purpose of 
constructing an IED was to simulate guilty knowledge as closely as possible in a 
laboratory environment. If there is no arousal associated with the concealed 
knowledge, defensive responding is unlikely to occur.  
Participants interacted with the screening system twice, with the second 
interaction occurring on the day immediately following the initial interaction. The 
repeated measures occurred at the screening station, where participants viewed 
four visual CIT foils, with oculomotor measurements recorded during the 




5.3.1 Experiment 2 Participants 
  Participants (N=172) were recruited from an introductory MIS course at a 
large southwestern university in the United States. This course includes students 
from across the university. Students participated to fulfill a course requirement to 
participate in a research experiment. Participants’ average age was 23; 61.7% were 
of Caucasian descent; 13.1% were from Asian or Pacific Islander descent; 17.1% 
were of Hispanic descent; and 6.3% were of multi-racial descent. Participant gender 
was evenly split: 50% percent were female and 50% were male. 
All human-subjects protocols were followed, and the experimental design 
was approved by the institution’s human subjects review board. Each participant 
was aware that their participation was strictly voluntary, and each was instructed 
that he or she could refuse to participate or halt participation at any time, and 
alternative means of fulfilling the course requirement were available. A review of 
anonymized, open-ended feedback collected at the end of the experiment revealed 
that although most participants in the guilty condition found the experience 
somewhat unnerving, they appreciated the stated goals of the experiment and 
hoped their participation would help improve security screening technology. 
5.3.2 Experiment 2 Task 
  The task I chose for the experiment focused on security screening for 
explosives because this is a real-world high-stakes scenario of interest where guilty 




conditions were Innocent and Guilty. After completing a short questionnaire, 
participants received written instructions telling them to pack a bag and deliver it to 
an office in a secure portion of the building. To enter the secure portion of the 
building, the participant needed to pass through a security screening process. 
Participants packed the bag with items provided (e.g. clothes, pad of paper, book, 
and other innocuous items). The instructions briefly mentioned that if judged 
suspicious, a secondary screening process would be necessary, which in the case of 
innocent participants would take additional time, thereby preventing them from 
delivering the bag in a timely manner. Guilty participants were reminded that a 
more in-depth screening would expose their deception and prevent their delivering 
a bag.  
  Participants in the Guilty condition had two additional instructions. First, 
they received instructions on how to construct a mock explosive device (pre-
assembled parts were provided) and were told to pack it in their bag along with the 
other items. Figure 6 is a photograph of an actual device used in the experiment. 
Second, they were shown a photograph of the face of a person to which they were to 
deliver the bag. After packing the bag, each participants came to the screening room 





Figure 6. Improvised explosive device (IED) constructed by half 
of participants. 
 
For this experiment, the ASK conducted five CIT-based questions. The first 
four CIT questions read as follows:  
The following items are not allowed beyond this point. Are you carrying any of 
these items? 
 
Of the four boxes containing foil items that were subsequently presented, 
only one contained a word that was designed to relate to guilty knowledge (i.e., 
“Bombs,” “Explosives”, “Weapons”), though all boxes contained a word describing a 




ensure they were equally arousing by default. Figure 7 illustrates the screen shown 
to the participants. The other items were certain to not be carried by participants, 
since what was packed in their bags was known beforehand1.  
 
 
Figure 7. Example of a simultaneous visual foil presented by ASK. 
 
The visual location of the item associated with guilty knowledge was rotated 
in a balanced fashion. The presentation order of visual foils was similarly rotated.  
As an exploratory measure, an additional CIT question presented by the ASK 
computerized voice read as follows:  
                                                        
1In a field environment, control items for the CIT would need to be carefully chosen such that they are certain to not be 
present. For instance, “rifle” could be an effective control foil item in many security screening field environments: 
screeners can be certain no rifles are present because they cannot be effectively hidden on one’s person and would be 




The following people are wanted by local authorities. Are you familiar with any of 
these people?  
 
Similar in format to the first four CIT questions, the ASK displayed four 
images on the screen immediately following the question (see Figure 8). For 
participants in the guilty condition, one of the faces evoked knowledge that the 
participant would desire to conceal: one image represented the same person to 
whom they were directed to deliver the IED in the instructions that preceded the 
screening process. Minear and Park (2004) approved and supplied specially 
designed face images for this experiment. To encourage a sense of realism, I chose to 
use images of faces that are most likely to remind participants of a stereotypical 
individual who might be involved in terrorist activity. I also chose faces that were 
fairly similar in features, to ensure an inordinate amount of attention would not be 
drawn to a particular face simply because it possessed features that stood out where 
others did not. This final visual CIT foil was added as an exploratory item; the 





Figure 8. Faces CIT foil. This was presented at the end of each 
screening, immediately after the question: "Are you familiar 
with any of these people?" 
 
Participants were asked not to disclose details of the experiment to anyone 
until a date when data collection would be completed. Each participant was also 
asked whether he or she had heard any details about the experiment prior to 
participating, and were promised that full credit would be given regardless of their 
answer to this question. 
5.3.3 Experiment 2 Measures 
The EyeTech eye tracking system exported raw data in Cartesian coordinate 




foil: the initial direction of the first saccade after each question (dummy coded as 1 
if toward critical foil item), and the percentage of time spent gazing at the safety 




6. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
The datasets for experiments 1 and 2 were analyzed separately. First 
reported are the analyses for experiment 1 investigating rigidity. For experiment 2, 
two analyses were performed. The first used eye movement data and the second 
involved response time. 
6.1 Experiment 1 (Rigidity Detection) Analysis and Results 
As part of the post-interview questionnaire, respondents self-reported their 
level of motivation and arousal on 7-point scales. Respondents also answered two 
questions regarding non-verbal behavioral control. The items used to measure these 
are shown in the table below.  
 
Table 3. Reliabilities and Means for Self-Reported Motivation, Arousal, and 
Non-Verbal Behavioral Control 
Measure Items Reliability Mean 
(S.D.) 
Motivation 
1.  During the interview, how important was 
it to you to succeed in making the 
interviewer believe you? 
2.  During the interview, how important was 
it to you to give convincing answers? 
3. How hard did you try to convince the 
interviewer that you were telling the truth? 
Cronbach’s 






















How effective were you in controlling your 







How much did you try to control your 
nonverbal behavior (gestures, posture, etc.) 





The difference in perceived effectiveness of controlling non-verbal behavior 
was not statistically different between the two conditions. Self-reported arousal and 
motivation levels likewise were not statistically different between groups. For the 
question regarding effort allocated to non-verbal control, participants in the guilty 
condition reported significantly (F= 7.39(1,133), η2 = .053; p = .007) more effort 
(M=4.59, s.d. = 1.79) than their counterparts (M = 3.65, SD = 2.01).  
The video recordings of each interview were analyzed using the computer 
vision techniques outlined in an earlier section. Because of technical problems with 
the video recording and analysis system, only 107 of the initial 134 cases produced 
usable data for analysis. Of these 107 participants, 64 were female. In this subset, 40 
participants “committed” the crime, leaving 67 who did not.  
         A multilevel regression model was specified for overall movement during 
each foil item. The summation of standardized movement scores for right hand, left 
hand, and head movement was used as the dependent variable. Multilevel 
regression models use adjusted standard errors to reflect the uncertainty that arises 
from variation within subject. The independent variables included Condition 




1 = Critical Item, 0 = Neutral Item). Question, and Interviewer were initially included 
as covariates but were not significant predictors and were subsequently dropped 
from the model. The effect of greatest interest is the Condition and Foil Item Type 
interaction. The results of the multilevel regression model are shown below.  
 
Table 4. Overall Movement: Multilevel Regression Model Results 
Fixed Effects β 
β Standard 
Error 
Intercept 0.044 (n.s.) 0.069 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge 0.102 (n.s.) 0.109 
Foil Item Type -0.197 (n.s.) 0.171 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 
Foil Item Type 
-0.624* 0.267 
Notes: N = 1887.  Model fit using maximum likelihood.   
             * p < .05, (n.s.) not significant. 
 
To test if the Condition and Item Type interaction provides a significant 
improvement to the fit of the data, the model was compared to an unconditional 
model, which omits any fixed effects, using deviance-based hypothesis tests. The fit 
of the current model was significantly better than the unconditional model, χ2(1, N = 
1887) = 17.15, p < .001.  
Depictions of the overall movement patterns are shown in the next three 
figures. Foil item 4 was the relevant (i.e. correct) item for CIT foils 1 and 3, and foil 
















Figure 11. Movement During CIT Foil 3 
 
An exploratory analysis was undertaken to identify whether rigidity was 
evenly dispersed across the body, or whether it was concentrated in one or more 
areas. Separate multilevel regression models were specified for the head, right hand, 






































Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 







Notes: N = 1887.  Model fit using maximum likelihood.   
             * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
      Each model was compared to an unconditional model. Compared to the 
unconditional model, the fit for the right hand and head movement models was 
significantly better: Head Movement χ2 (1, N = 1887) = 30.55, p = .000; Right Hand 
Movement χ2 (1, N = 1887) = 9.87, p = .020; Left Hand Movement χ2 (1, N = 1887) = 
2.16, p = .540. 
      The figures below illustrate the relationship between guilt and right hand 
movement for CIT relevant vs. irrelevant items for two sample CIT foils. On average, 
a guilty participant’s right hand moved less during relevant foil items than 
irrelevant foil items. Innocent participants showed no difference in their right hand 






Figure 12. Right hand movement during CIT Foil 2 
 
 





6.1.1 Comparison of Head Movement Measurement Techniques 
Both the ASM and skin blob tracking computer vision techniques provide 
usable data for measuring head movement. The ASM data was produced using video 
of a close-up view of the head, while the skin blob tracking data was produced using 
a full body frame. The ASM data was chosen for the above analyses because the 
close-up view provided the ability to measure head movement at the more fine-
grained level. In other words, more head movement was visible in the close-up view 
than in the full-body view. Both camera angles were recorded in standard definition. 
Does the close-up view actually improve measurement? To test this 
assumption, I compare the model of head movement based on the close-up video to 
a model produced using the full body video. Both models are based on the same 
participants and experiment, yet the model that employs facial close-up video 
produced statistically significant results while the other did not. A comparison of the 





Table 6. Comparison of head movement models 
Fixed Effects 
Head Movement 
(using full-body video) 
Head Movement 


















Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 





Notes: N = 1887.  Model fit using maximum likelihood.   
             * p < .05, ** p < .01. 
 
6.1.2 Classification Accuracy of Rigidity in the CIT 
      To estimate how effective this pattern might be in a predictive application, I 
performed a receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to assess the ability of 
overall rigidity for predicting guilt. The ROC curve reflects the tradeoffs between a 
true positive rate (sensitivity) and false positive rate (1 minus specificity) when 
selecting a classification model. If, for example, all interviewees were classified as 
guilty, guilt detection accuracy would be 100%, but all innocent parties would be 
incorrectly classified as guilty as well, producing a 100% false positive rate.  The 
standardized movement scores for head and hands for critical items were included 
as predictor variables. This produced an area under the curve (AUC) of .77, which 




model produces a Nagelkerke R2 of .28 and a Cox & Snell R2 of .21. The ROC curve is 
represented graphically in the figure below.  
 
Figure 14. ROC Curve Estimating the Predictive Power of Rigidity in the CIT in 
Experiment 1. 
   
 The 77% prediction accuracy is comparable to the 77% accuracy produced 




interviewers possessed extensive training and made judgments based on both the 
CIT and an interrogation conducted prior to the CIT, whereas the automated kinesic 
classification reported here used only CIT data.  
  
6.2 Experiment 2 (ASK Oculomotor) Analysis 
Of the 172 participants, 36 were disqualified either because they did not 
follow instructions (23 cases), or because of system failures2 (13 cases). Data from 
the remaining 136 participants were used in the analysis. 
To assess whether the manipulation worked properly, manipulation check 
questions were added to the post-survey to determine:  (1) whether guilty 
participants possessed concealed knowledge, and (2) whether the concealed 
knowledge was perceived as aversive by participants. Experiment conductors had 
visual confirmation that those in the guilty condition constructed and packed the 
mock IED. However it was important to ensure that participants understood that 
these actions were illicit, or there would be little reason for a defensive response. 
The vast majority of participants (57 of 61 or 93%) in the guilty condition correctly 
reported that they had carried an illicit item through security screening. On the 
second day, 54 of 57 (95%) in the guilty condition correctly reported their attempt 
                                                        
2
 Physical eye damage and a small percentage of glasses proved problematic. Additionally, the 
narrowness of the range of allowed head movement caused some of the failures. Alternative eye-tracking 
systems and modified calibration algorithms will be used to minimize these types of system failures in 




to carry an illicit item through screening. Those participants who either confessed 
or All participants in the innocent condition correctly reported on both days that 
they did not carry an illicit item. For each stimulus word, all participants reported 
how much attention that stimulus captured on a 7-point scale, to gauge their 
perceived signal value. On day 1, participants in the guilty condition rated the signal 
value of critical items higher than non-critical items (F = 107.9 (1, 120), η2 = .47, p < 
0.001), while innocent participants reported no significant difference (F = 2.8(1,144), 
η2 = .02, p = .095). Day 2 showed similar results, with guilty participants reporting 
higher signal value on critical items (F = 37.7(1,112), η2 = .25, p < .001), and innocent 
participants showing no such effect (F = 2.1(1,132), η2 = .02, p = .15). Table 2 displays 
self-reported signal value statistics. 
 
Table 7. Means and standard deviations of self-reported signal value of foil 
items 






















A multilevel regression model was specified (n = 1020) using mean time 
gazing at the safety point (center of the screen) as the response variable. Participant 
(n = 136) was treated as a random factor, while the experiment condition, foil type 
(baseline or charged), and participation day were treated as fixed effects. Foil 




When a visual foil was charged (i.e., contained a critical item), only participants in 
the guilty condition spent significantly more time (4.5%) gazing at the safety point 
(t (1013) = 3.06, p < .01). The strength of this effect significantly increased (another 
3.5%) on day 2, again only among participants in the guilty condition (t (1013) = 2.70, 
p < .01). Location of the critical item on the screen (which quadrant) was initially 
included in the model but was not significant and was subsequently removed. Time 
likewise showed no significant effect and was removed from the model. Foil 
presentation order was significant. When the foil containing the word “bombs” was 
the first charged visual foil presented, gaze effects were more pronounced than 
when the critical item was “explosives” or “weapons.” Table 3 summarizes the 
multilevel regression results. 
Table 8. Oculomotor Threat Avoidance (Gazing at the Center of the Screen) as 
Response Variable for the Word CIT Foils 
Fixed Effects β 
β Standard 
Error 
Intercept 0.110*** 0.014 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge 0.005 (n.s.) 0.019 
Participation Day 0.000 (n.s.) 0.009 
Threatening Foil 0.016 (n.s.) 0.010 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 
Participation Day   
0.035** 0.013 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 
Threatening Foil 
0.045** 0.015 
Foil Presentation Order 2 -0.021* 0.010 
Foil Presentation Order 3 -0.022* 0.011 
Notes: model fit by maximum likelihood.  *** p < .001;    





To test model fit, the model was compared to an unconditional model which 
omitted any fixed effects, using deviance-based hypothesis tests. The fit of the 
current model was significantly better than the unconditional model, χ2(1, N = 
1020) = 64.69, p < .001.  
An overall logistic multilevel regression revealed no main effect of condition 
on the direction of the initial saccade. However, a near-significant interaction effect 
of condition and participation day was noted, z(765) = 1.79, p = .07. Separate analyses 
for each day revealed that for participants with guilty knowledge, the initial saccade 
was biased toward the critical item during the second day of screening, z(360) = 2.34, 
Nagelkerke R2 = .14, p = .02, but not the first day, z(404) = -0.04, Nagelkerke R2 = .12, p 
= .88. The model fit for the second day was significant compared to an unconditional 
model, χ2(1, N = 360) = 8.41, p < .05.  
The exploratory CIT question involving faces was analyzed separate from 
words. Multilevel regression models for the faces question were specified similar to 
those used for questions involving word stimuli. Hidden guilty knowledge was 
associated with a 6% increase in the amount of time gazing at the center of the 
screen, t (249) = 3.00, p < .01.  There were no main or interaction effects of 
participation day. There were no significant effects of condition on initial saccade 
for the faces CIT foil. 
The results indicate that guilty knowledge significantly affected both the 
tendency to look toward the critical item in a foil and the tendency to avoid looking 




causes visual attention to orient toward a critical item in a CIT foil (H1) is partially 
supported, with significant results occurring in day 2 but not in day 1. The 
hypothesis that the orienting reflex would diminish over time (H2) was not 
supported. The hypothesis that defensive behavior would encourage visual 
attentiveness toward the safety point (H4) was supported. Finally, the hypothesis 
that the defensive behavior effect would remain over time was supported (H5). 
 
6.2.1 Oculomotor Defensive Behavior Classification Accuracy 
An accuracy analysis can help establish that the initial system has some 
potential value. The problem of trying to detect concealed knowledge in security 
screening can be conceptualized as a signal detection problem (Basuchoudhary & 
Razzolini, 2006; Ben-Shakhar, Lieblich, & Kugelmas.S, 1970). 
Since oculomotor defensive behavior showed the strongest results, a receiver 
operating characteristic (ROC) analysis was performed on those data for each day. 
Condition was positioned as the response variable, with gaze patterns during word 
visual foils positioned as the predictor variables. For day 1, the oculomotor defense 
patterns produced an area under the curve (AUC) of .67; an AUC of .68 was 






Day 1 Day 2 
Figure 15. ROC Curves for Day 1 and 2 Oculomotor Defensive Behavior 
 
6.3 Experiment 2 (ASK Response Time) Analysis  
Response times were calculated by manually coding and calculating the time 
lapsed between the end of each question and the beginning of each response. 
Because these response time analyses were performed as part of a separate 
research project, some of the results summarized here are expected to also be 
reported by Hsu (2012). However, here I include additional analyses and discussion. 
A multilevel regression model was specified (n = 1020) using response time 
as the dependent variable. Participant (n = 136) was treated as a random factor, 




day were treated as fixed effects. Foil question order and critical item position on 
the screen were included as covariates.  
As reported in Table 9, there was an overall main effect of participation day 
and foil charge. There was no main effect of condition, but there was a three-way 
interaction effect among condition, foil charge, and participation day. There was also 
a significant two-way interaction between foil charge and participation day.  The 
order of presentation likewise had a significant effect: response time decreased 
slightly but significantly when the foil with the word “Bombs” was presented second 
rather than first or last. 
 When a visual foil was charged (i.e., contained a critical item), all participants 
regardless of condition exhibited significantly shorter response times. Response 
times also decreased the second day of participation; however, this effect was 
moderated by the presence of a threatening foil item and completely disappeared 
for those in the guilty condition. In other words, on the second day of participation, 
guilty participants took longer to respond when foils that contained threatening 





Table 9. Response Time Multilevel Regression Results 
Fixed Effects β 
β Standard 
Error 
Intercept 3.230*** 0.092 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge 0.105 (n.s.) 0.127 
Participation Day -0.699*** 0.089 
Threatening Foil -0.534*** 0.071 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 
Participation Day   
-0.129 (n.s.) 0.132 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 
Threatening Foil 
-0.140 (n.s.) 0.103 
Participation Day : 
Threatening Foil 
0.378*** 0.102 
Hidden Guilty Knowledge : 
Threatening Foil : 
Participation Day 
0.398** 0.151 
Foil Presentation Order 2 -0.124* 0.052 
Foil Presentation Order 3 -0.041(n.s.) 0.058 
Notes: model fit by maximum likelihood.  *** p < .001;    
** p < .01;   * p < .05;   (n.s.) not significant. 
 
The response time model fit was strong compared to an unconditional model, 
χ2(1, N = 1020) = 228.62, p < .001.  
 
6.3.1  Response Time and Combined Classification Accuracy 
A ROC analysis was performed that again specified condition as the response 
variable and used response times from the first 4 slides as predictor variables. For 
day 1, the ROC analysis produced an AUC of .57; an AUC of .66 was produced from 





Day 1 Day 2 
Figure 16. ROC Curves for Day 1 and 2 Response Time 
 
A final ROC analysis was performed that combined both response time and 
oculomotor defensive behavior. Time spent gazing at the center of the screen for the 
first four questions were included with response times for the same questions as 
predictor variables. For day 1, the ROC analysis produced an AUC of .70; an AUC of 







Day 1 Day 2 
Figure 17. ROC Curves for combined oculomotor defensive response and 
response time. 
 
 Though the combined classification shows improvement over the response 
time or oculomotor defensive response models independently, analysis of deviance 
tests suggest that the improvements may not be significant for either Day 1 (χ2 (1, N 








 The purpose of this study was to propose and investigate theory, protocol, 
and system design for the automated discovery of hidden knowledge. I chose to 
center the ASK system design on the CIT screening protocol because of its 
automation and interaction simplicity, and because it is considered to have the 
highest validity in previous research. I applied both orienting and defensive 
response theories to this novel area of research. This study proposed a method for 
using computer vision techniques to assess rigidity, and for the first time rigidity 
and oculomotor variables were investigated as potential cues to deception in a CIT.  
The table below provides a summary of the hypotheses in this study. 
 
Table 10. Summary of Hypotheses Support 
Hypothesis Supported? 
H1. Guilty knowledge increases the likelihood that an initial saccade will 
be directed toward the critical item in a collection of simultaneously 
presented CIT foil items. 
Partially 
H2. Over time, stimuli representing guilty knowledge will be less likely to 
attract the initial saccade. 
No 
H3: Guilty Knowledge will increase response latency when a critical item 
is presented. 
Yes 
H4. Guilty knowledge increases time spent gazing at the safety point. 
 
Yes 
H5. Guilty knowledge increases critical stimuli avoidance during repeat 
exposures. 
Yes 
H6: Guilty knowledge will increase body movement rigidity while a 







 The results provide support for the potential for automated rigidity detection 
and oculomotor defensive behavior as alternative measurements in an ASK-like 
human screening system design. Because of the relative novelty of this line of 
research, there are many caveats, lessons learned, and areas for future research to 
consider. The results will first be discussed separately and then in combination. 
 
7.1 Experiment 1 Discussion 
 The purposes of experiment 1 were two-fold: the first was to implement 
automated rigidity detection and glean insights from its use. The second was to 
provide empirical evidence of the rigidity effect during a CIT. These two factors 
inform the broader goal of investigating the potential of the proposed system design 
for automated human screening for concealed knowledge.   
7.1.1 Experiment 1 Summary of Results 
 Several insights were gleaned from implementing the automated rigidity 
detection system. First, in spite of very little movement being present throughout 
the CIT, the system was able to detect movement variations that discriminated 
innocent from guilty participants in a realistic scenario. Second, greater ability to 





  The empirical evaluation of rigidity in a CIT produced very interesting 
results.  An overall significant decrease in movement was found among those who 
had stolen a ring when an interviewer presented the CIT critical item as compared 
to when a non-critical item was presented. This significant decrease was present 
across all three CIT foils. When total movement was broken down into head, right 
hand, and left hand movement, head and right hand movement proved significant 
while left hand movement did not, though it trended in the same direction. 
7.1.2 Experiment 1 Key Contributions 
The first key contribution of experiment 1 is evidence that supports the 
proposition that rigidity is an active phenomenon in a CIT. Past research has 
identified rigidity in less controlled interviewing environments, but contextual 
variables such as question type effects may complicate or confound results. The CIT, 
however, provides a simple, standardized, reproducible method that is free of 
question type effects. This standardization and control provide a high level of 
internal and external validity which benefits both research and practice. 
In the experiment 1 CIT, interviewees did not explicitly lie. But although no 
verbal deception occurred, the results showed that interviewees with guilty 
knowledge exhibited defensive responding in the form of rigidity. While prior 
research has confirmed that rigidity is associated with deception, most of these 
studies have focused on active deception that involves communicative gesturing. 




of the lack of major movement. However, by applying defensive response theory, 
this study provides evidence for the potential of kinesic cues in a CIT context. 
Specifically, whenever a threat is perceived among alternative benign stimuli, 




Though rigidity appears to stem from defensive responding, this research 
stopped short of discovering the precise type of response(s) that caused the rigidity. 
However, one theoretical contribution of this work is to show that rigidity occurs 
even when very little fabrication is required. Some prior research has suggested that 
a higher demand on cognitive resources for fabrication may be a cause of rigidity, as 
there should be fewer cognitive resources available to allocate toward non-verbal 
messaging. But the results of this study indicate that rigidity can occur even when 
demands for fabrication are minimal.  
  A second major contribution of this study was the introduction of automatic 
detection of rigidity. Where in the past, the high cost of manual rigidity assessment 
in standardized interviewing has limited its use to interested researchers, this study 
shows that an automated, near-real time system for measuring and reporting 
rigidity is feasible. A post-hoc, qualitative viewing of a sample of the interviews from 
experiment 1 indicated that human coding of rigidity during a CIT may be very 
difficult, because for most cases, human observers seem to find it difficult to 
distinguish the relative amount of movement among foil items. This idea is further 
bolstered by the fact that higher resolution video of the interviewee’s head was 
required to discover the rigidity effect—standard definition video using full-body 
frame was insufficient to detect the significant variation in head movement. 
The left hand was similar to the head in that a post-hoc qualitative visual 




movement. There was no video focused in on the left hand, so it is not possible with 
the current dataset to determine whether a rigidity effect was present in that hand.  
The majority of movement throughout the CIT was in the right hand. No data 
were collected on the handedness of participants, but based on general population 
statistics one can estimate that about 90% of participants were right-handed. It 
seems likely that even minor, random movements are most likely to be performed 
by the dominant hand. Future research in this area may benefit from including 
handedness in the explanatory or predictive model. 
7.1.3 Experiment 1 Limitations and Future Research 
The ~77% prediction accuracy of the rigidity effect reflected the ~77% 
prediction accuracy of trained polygraph professionals. This was true in spite of the 
fact that the professionals had more data to work with (i.e., the pre-CIT interview). 
However, it is unclear if the portions of the interview prior to the CIT helped or 
hindered the interviewer’s ability to make a judgment. Similarly, the interview 
questions prior to the activity could have had some preparatory or dampening effect 
on the CIT. Since the ultimate goal of this research is to move toward an automatic 
human screening system, future research will need to investigate these factors and 
determine how they might play a role. 
In the same vein, the effects of the interviewer are unclear. Even though the 
interviewer plays a minimal role in the CIT, it is possible that a human may 




just as this study has shown that it is possible for the examinee to unconsciously 
give away their own guilty knowledge. Factors such as interviewer gender, dress, 
demeanor, timing, eye contact and other characteristics and behaviors could affect 
the level of anxiety or perceived threat of the interviewee. Interestingly, when the 
critical item in a foil was presented, increased rigidity in head movement was 
present even among innocent participants, though to a lesser degree than among 
guilty participants. Post-hoc analyses showed that this phenomenon was present 
during all three CIT foils, though strong enough to be statistically significant only in 
the third foil. Further exploration is needed to determine the source of this anomaly 
and if it can be remedied using an automated interviewer such as a disembodied 
voice or other conversational agent. 
 Finally, it is clear that technology and process improvements can and should 
be made on this initial investigation. However a 77% accuracy rate is an 
encouraging result for the first iteration. Future research should focus both on 
improving the prediction capability of automated rigidity measurement, and 
combining rigidity with other cues to concealed information for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the interaction.  
 
7.2 Experiment 2 Discussion 
Experiment 2 also had two main goals. The first was similar to experiment 1 in 




knowledge, this time targeting oculomotor and response time indicators. Secondly it 
allowed an evaluation of the performance of an instantiated automated human 
screening system in the form of an ASK. This section will discuss the results of the 
oculometric analysis; the next section will discuss the performance of the ASK 
against the design criteria. 
7.2.1 Experiment 2 Summary of Results 
The results support the hypotheses that oculomotor defensive behavior 
would be apparent in participants who possessed guilty hidden knowledge. As 
predicted, participants carrying a mock IED tended to avoid gazing at foil items—
choosing to spend more time gazing at the center of the screen (i.e., the “safety 
point”) where the expected visual stimulus was unrelated to the test. This effect 
remained constant even on the second day of participation when participants were 
familiar with the ASK. 
The orienting response, traditionally measured in practice via monitoring 
electrodermal activity, heart rate, and/or respiration, was somewhat effectively 
measured using eye-movement patterns, as is commonly seen in cognitive 
psychology research. Participants who carried the mock IED were more likely to 
orient their initial visual attention toward the critical foil item presented by ASK. 
However, this effect was seen only on the second day of participation. 
Response time followed a slightly different pattern. All participants took 




confounded by an ordering effect: the non-threatening foil always came first. 
Participants may well have simply taken more time to respond during the first foil 
than to subsequent foils.  
Response time decreased on the second day, presumably because 
participants were more familiar with the process and therefore required less high-
level cognition, or were able to use cognitive resources more efficiently. However, 
guilty participants’ response time did not decrease on the second day when 
threatening items were presented. This is somewhat consistent with previous 
research that shows an increased response time when critical items are presented 
(Seymour, et al., 2000). These results suggest promise for using this measure in 
automated screening. However, because of limitations in the experimental design 
and outstanding research questions regarding the easiness of countering this 
measure (Gronau, et al., 2005), further research should be done before drawing 
conclusions on the validity and reliability of response time for automated screening 
systems. 
Overarching the hypotheses was the proposition that a CIT-based system like 
the ASK could be automated and extended to non-traditional domains for the 
discovery of valuable concealed knowledge. While further research is needed to 
refine the ASK design, the initial results are promising. The ASK operated 
automatically, with little need for manual intervention, and utilized the CIT 
framework to detect concealed information at a rate greater than chance and 




7.2.2 Experiment 2 Contributions to Research and Practice 
  There are three major research contributions of this second study. This first 
is the application of orienting and defensive response theories to automated 
screening for concealed information. Second, oculomotor cues to concealed 
knowledge were identified, and response time was investigated in this new 
application. Third, these theories were successfully instantiated in an implemented 
automated system, where further insights were gleaned beyond the hypotheses 
specifically tested.  
  While the orienting reflex has been part of the traditional CIT since its 
inception, defensive responding has not been a major focus of CIT research. In this 
study orienting and defensive responding were measured simultaneously through  
oculomotor indicators of concealed knowledge. Oculometric measures have been 
used in research settings since 1902 and has recently found application in IS and 
deception detection research. However, this study is among the first to use eye 
movement as an indicator of concealed knowledge. The orienting reflex measure 
used in this study (the direction of the initial saccade) is common to cognitive 
psychology research in that eye focus is assumed to orient toward stimuli perceived 
to be novel or personally significant. Detecting defensive responding via oculomotor 
patterns, however, is an underexplored area. This study found strong effects of 
defensive responding in eye movement patterns. These effects could also have 




to analyze what individuals do look at, when in fact what a person does not look at 
may have more signal value if it is threatening in nature. 
7.2.3 Experiment 2 Limitations and Future Directions 
Order effects and stimuli type are an important limitation to consider in light 
of the results of experiment 2. Some of the results were potentially confounded by 
the fact that non-threatening foils were always presented first, rather than being 
interspersed throughout the foils that contained threatening items. This seemed to 
have an effect especially on response time. Future research should investigate order 
effects further.  
There were at least two areas for improvement regarding the modified CIT 
used in this study. First, images may perform better than words as stimuli in this 
system. Though the orienting reflex can occur prior to detection, it is unclear 
whether four words can be subconsciously identified prior to the initial saccade. 
Images may be more easily processed by parafoveal visual attention and thereby 
may produce improved results. However, the color, tone, and type of images can in 
and of themselves demand an orienting response, so careful selection and pretesting 
of images would be an important step to take.  
The second area for improvement involves a “hurry up” instruction. 
Encouraging the participant to respond as quickly as possible should increase the 
likelihood that eye movements will be reflexive rather than overt. An example 




questions as quickly as possible. Extended hesitations may lead to additional 
screening.” The orienting reflex is a reflex, and is probably more likely to influence 
eye movement when that eye movement is not being consciously controlled. 
 
7.3 Evaluation of ASK Design 
The ASK system and associated process marks the beginning of iterative 
research into human screening systems searching for concealed information. This 
section discusses the various aspects of ASK in light of the design principles inspired 
by the CIT. 
The first two design principles are repeated below: 
1. Identify appropriate stimuli that represent the concealed knowledge in 
question. Ensure there is reasonably strong certainty that the 
representation has relatively high personal significance for a person who is 
concealing such knowledge. 
2. Identify irrelevant stimuli that each arouse the same baseline level of 
orienting and defensive responses. 
The ASK process identified appropriate stimuli by selecting first the target 
stimulus of interest (in this case, an explosive), then selecting and pretesting (via a 
survey) items that produced a similar orienting response. High personal significance 
of the critical item was ensured (manipulation checks supported this) because of the 




In a field implementation of ASK, selecting and pretesting items can be just as 
simple to do. There is no way to be 100% certain of personal significance in a field 
setting, but because the crime is in progress or planned, high personal significance 
should be even more likely than what one would expect to see in criminal 
investigations where the crime may be several months removed from the CIT being 
performed. 
3. Develop several foils consisting of relevant and irrelevant stimuli in a one-
to-many ratio.  
The foils used in ASK were an adaptation of the standard CIT such as the one 
performed in experiment 1. The foils were presented visually and simultaneously. 
Visual, simultaneous foils decreased the time necessary to conduct a screening and 
seemed to elicit strong defensive responses, but further investigation is needed to 
determine the most effective way for an ASK to present the foils.  
4. Automatically present these foils in an environment free of potential 
distractions, including but not limited to human distractions. 
Distractions have potential to be problematic for a CIT because orienting and 
defensive responses are sensitive to alternative stimuli. The ASK used in this study 
was situated in a separate room where virtually no outside sound could be heard 
and no interruptions would occur. In a field environment, a similar setup would be 
ideal: a location free from alternative stimuli. This may mean a booth-like setup in a 
rapid screening application or a separated office in a more investigative application.  




though individuals sat down for the short screening process, the monitor and chair 
often had to be manually adjusted to properly capture eye movement. An eye 
tracking system that allows more freedom in head movement and/or an ASK that 
has greater height and depth adjustability would be an important improvement to 
ensure the best capture of oculometric data. 
5. During foil presentation, automatically capture human indicators of the 
orienting and/or defensive responses. 
The ASK collected eye tracking, kinesic, and vocalic data, but required post-
processing to translate this raw data into usable indicators. Field implementations 
of an ASK need indicators and risk assessments in near-real time. Foil segmentation 
is one of the challenges to this design principle. All captured data needs to be 
segmented temporally in order to understand which eye movement, body 
movement, and so on is associated with which foil or foil item. For experiment 1 and 
part of experiment 2, this segmentation process was done manually. The ASK in this 
study did automatically segment the eye tracking data by allowing a set amount of 
time for a response before moving to the next foil. The data for each succeeding foil 
was tagged according to which time segment it fell under. Other methods that could 
be used to segment data are through speech recognition or asking the examinee to 
press a button when his or her response is complete. 
6. Apply categorization algorithms to the collected data to assess concealed 
knowledge. 




exceeded chance levels, but require more sophistication and/or combination with 
other measures to be viable for a field context. Additional non-invasive, non-contact 
candidate measures may in include measuring uncertainty and stress via vocalic 
analysis and measuring the orienting response with via pupillometry algorithms 
applied to high-speed cameras. 
 
7.4 Overall Key Contributions 
  This research shows that there is promise in extending the traditional 
applications of concealed knowledge testing. The traditional CIT is a powerful 
method for this type of knowledge discovery testing. In the traditional CIT, an 
individual’s orienting response when presented with irrelevant stimuli is compared 
to his or her response when presented with relevant stimuli. Traditionally, the CIT 
protocol has not been widely adopted in practice, except in a small number of 
criminal investigations (Japan being a notable exception, where it is more commonly 
used). This study takes the first steps toward overcoming the barriers that have 
prevented more widespread use in both criminal investigations and alternative 
arenas. This is accomplished by designing the automated screening kiosk (ASK) 
system to leverage the core principles of the CIT, while introducing alternative 
measures that do not require human intervention.  
  Alternative or enhanced measures such as kinesic and oculomotor cues to 




concealed knowledge, because they eliminate the need for specialized personnel or 
invasive equipment. The non-invasive, low-cost nature of an ASK design may be a 
welcome contrast to traditional techniques that use SCR, respiration, and heart rate 
monitors, as well as more recent CIT techniques using fMRI, all of which can be 
prohibitively expensive for widespread use in practice. 
  The positive results of this study suggest that a simple procedure could be 
developed to complement screening at high risk locations such as airports, public 
events, or border crossings. Unlike current screening systems which attempt to find 
the threat itself (e.g. by checking x-ray images for shapes that look like weapons), an 
ASK system may not identify the specific threat, but rather indicate that further 
investigation is warranted. Adding an abstract layer to the screening system might 
be comparable to an antivirus program that isn’t limited to searching for threats 
that have signatures identified in the past, but also investigates program behaviors 
that might indicate a need for a closer look. 
  The search for concealed information need not be limited to municipal 
organizations. In locations where law allows, businesses can use an ASK system to 
improve internal security or help prevent insecure behavior. For instance, an ASK 
could determine which employees are most likely to be leaking sensitive company 
information. An ASK interaction could also become part of a regular security policy 
review course. Where an employee may not be willing to openly admit negligence or 
mistakes with regard to secure behavior, an ASK could help discretely determine 




level. An ASK could potentially apply to many situations where an organization 
needs to know about specific events but its members are motivated to hide what 
they know.  
 Even the traditional CIT as it is used today may also benefit from integrating 
these additional indicators. While traditional measures rely exclusively on the 
orienting response, the results of this study indicate that defensive responding can 
also distinguish concealed knowledge from lack of knowledge, when that the 
concealed knowledge in question is associated with a level of anxiety to the 
examinee. Drawing from more than one underlying mechanism can make 
countering a CIT more difficult. CIT practitioners and researchers can also use an 
automated approach to control for interviewer effects. 
As this work is expanded and refined, this proactive threat-detection system 
can conceivably complement current physical security screening processes. Similar 
to behavioral virus detection in virtual environments, screeners can use an ASK-like 
system to detect threats or valuable concealed knowledge in a physical 
environment—even if the specifics of the threat are unknown. 
Though physical security was the chosen field of interest for this study, the 
findings of this study can potentially extend to many similar applications, such as 
internal fraud investigations, policy compliance examinations, and uncovering B2B 
espionage. In each case, the ASK will need to be tailored to the situation at hand, 




8. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
  Several limitations of this study provide important opportunities for future 
research. This original study is at the beginning of a stream of research that will 
further investigate concealed knowledge detection. Among the limitations that need 
to be addressed are the “witness” problem of the CIT, further refinement of the 
process and system, and the potential for defeating countermeasures.  
 Distinguishing between guilty persons and innocent witnesses is an inherent 
limitation of the CIT (Gamer, 2010). For instance, in a security screening scenario, it 
is feasible to witness or to know about an illegal or improper activity, while not 
having participated in the activity directly. For instance, an examinee may purposely 
conceal knowledge that a friend is smuggling drugs or weapons through a screening 
checkpoint, though the examinee may not be personally participating in the activity. 
Further investigation of such guilty knowledge may or may not be desirable in that 
situation. Though the current study did not address this limitation, future work 
should assess how this witness problem may be minimized.  
Future research will improve on the design principles of automated human 
screening systems and the methods of measuring the orienting and defensive 
responses. There are at least two possible reasons why the orienting reflex was not 
as effective as expected. First, cognitive psychology research on the orienting reflex 
usually includes instructions to the participant to respond as quickly as possible. 




possibility is that word-based cues require more peripheral attention processing 
than relatively lower-level visual cues such as an image of an object. Future research 
is needed to investigate these considerations. 
 Future research will also investigate additional non-invasive methods for 
identifying concealed knowledge. Some promising potential technologies include 
face movement analysis for detecting emotion, vocalic analysis for measuring voice 
stress, pupillometry for measuring the orienting reflex, and linguistic analysis for 
detecting strategic message manipulation. 
  Using several methods simultaneously may be critical for overcoming 
countermeasures. Countermeasures are methods examinees use to “counter” or beat 
the test system. Countermeasures have been shown to be somewhat effective 
against the CIT and related veracity assessment techniques. There is some indirect 
evidence that the use of multiple heterogeneous sensors designed to detect different 
effects of concealed knowledge may help deter countermeasures (D. C. Derrick, et 
al., 2010; Nunamaker, Derrick, Elkins, Burgoon, & Patton, 2011). A combination of 
effective measures may make countermeasures much less effective, because an 
individual’s limited cognitive capacity should hinder the number and type of 
countermeasures that can be simultaneously employed. 
   The apparatus and sensors for a second instantiation of an ASK has already 
been assembled and will soon be developed into a revised ASK. This second 
iteration begins to address many of the limitations mentioned here. A description of 




  Finally, it is important to note that a CIT screening system will likely never be 
foolproof. Thus, its main contributions will be as risk assessment and decision 
support, and as a means of automatically identifying extremes—those true who are 
extremely likely and unlikely to be a concern. These objective assessments can free 






 This research proposed, implemented, and evaluated a human screening 
system design for the discovery of the presence of valuable concealed knowledge. 
The ASK system design draws from psychology research on hidden information 
discovery, improving on existing CIT research by detecting the orienting reflex and 
defensive response non-invasively and automatically. To accomplish these goals, 
alternative automated methods for detecting these underlying mechanisms were 
tested and shown to have merit.  A CIT screening system such as the ASK can 
indicate the presence of potential threats or malintent even if a specific threatening 
activity has not yet been tried before. The ASK system design also decreases the 
need for specialized training and lengthy setup times. This work adds to concealed 
knowledge detection research by introducing new oculometric and kinesic variables 
as indicators of detecting guilty knowledge. An ASK system could serve as an 
inexpensive first-level screening filter and also as a decision support system for 








10. APPENDIX A: THE SECOND ASK ITERATION 
 A second instantiation of a screening system based on the ASK design 
principles has already been assembled. This ASK is pictured below. 
 
Figure 18. The second iteration of an ASK system. 
  
 This second iteration overcomes limitations of real-time feature generation by 




improves on previous methods by collecting data in real time rather than using 
post-processing on traditional video. Rather than tracking positions of head and 
hands only, the Kinect generates frame-by-frame positions of 20 points on the body. 
The Kinect also tracks these points in three dimensions using a stereoscopic camera. 
Basic software for capturing this data has been developed and can be found in 
Appendix B along with sample data output. A force platform that independently 
measures movement on the left- and right-hand sides of the body will also collect 
kinesic data. These improvements will provide increased ability to measure rigidity 
and also investigate additional kinesic cues to concealed knowledge.  
 The Kinect does not track facial movement, so the ASK includes a high 
definition camera trained on the face and will incorporate facial movement tracking 
software. A microphone for voice recognition and vocalic analysis is affixed. An eye 
tracking system that collects blink, pupillometric, and eye movement data is also 
included. The ASK has a touchscreen for tactile interaction and measurement.  
 The ASK is also placed on a reticulating arm, allowing the apparatus to be 
adjusted to optimal height and depth for a given person and context. The ASK is 
easily mounted to a wall or a pole and can be easily switched back and forth. 
Alternate sensors can also be added or taken away with relative ease. The purpose 
of this ASK is not to serve as a finished model, but as a configurable platform for 




11. APPENDIX B: CODE AND DATA SAMPLES FOR REAL-TIME 
KINESIC DATA CAPTURE SOFTWARE 
 Below is some sample data that is generated by the ASK in real time using a 




Millisecond  SkeletonID  JointID  JointX  JointY  JointZ 
6:16:08  39 4 HipCenter 0.06166497 -0.1605196 2.747354 
6:16:08  39 4 Spine 0.05519164 -0.099904 2.804271 
6:16:08  39 4 ShoulderCenter 0.06627864 0.2650657 2.832123 
6:16:08  39 4 Head 0.07043894 0.4582048 2.821789 
6:16:08  39 4 ShoulderLeft -0.1033907 0.140487 2.788962 
6:16:08  39 4 ElbowLeft -0.1819153 -0.07149 2.764786 
6:16:08  39 4 WristLeft -0.2609192 -0.2773067 2.702001 
6:16:08  39 4 HandLeft -0.3152553 -0.3335559 2.660625 
6:16:08  39 4 ShoulderRight 0.2483098 0.142146 2.845469 
6:16:08  39 4 ElbowRight 0.3048614 -0.07658 2.828591 
6:16:08  39 4 WristRight 0.3707651 -0.2923496 2.80153 
6:16:08  39 4 HandRight 0.4662179 -0.5522138 2.788885 
6:16:08  39 4 HipLeft -0.01831 -0.239352 2.714637 
6:16:08  39 4 KneeLeft -0.1087503 -0.5795925 2.655539 
6:16:08  39 4 AnkleLeft -0.1062556 -0.8309524 2.594287 
6:16:08  39 4 FootLeft -0.1400814 -0.7488239 2.603081 
6:16:08  39 4 HipRight 0.139947 -0.2386055 2.744128 
6:16:08  39 4 KneeRight 0.1758052 -0.5844672 2.648381 
6:16:08  39 4 AnkleRight 0.1864027 -0.8381631 2.617846 
6:16:08  39 4 FootRight 0.1557258 -0.7717767 2.610299 
6:16:08  54 4 HipCenter 0.06172369 -0.1580266 2.750765 
6:16:08  54 4 Spine 0.05535929 -0.0981434 2.807629 
6:16:08  54 4 ShoulderCenter 0.06669749 0.2651726 2.83489 
6:16:08  54 4 Head 0.07049168 0.458257 2.825631 
6:16:08  54 4 ShoulderLeft -0.1037694 0.1405163 2.792696 
6:16:08  54 4 ElbowLeft -0.2164899 -0.0815465 2.755363 




6:16:08  54 4 HandLeft -0.4394781 -0.4457697 2.640919 
6:16:08  54 4 ShoulderRight 0.2491306 0.1425115 2.84924 
6:16:08  54 4 ElbowRight 0.3247877 -0.0949460 2.829608 
6:16:08  54 4 WristRight 0.4464777 -0.3118598 2.799425 
6:16:08  54 4 HandRight 0.5711275 -0.5212782 2.79853 
6:16:08  54 4 HipLeft -0.018705 -0.2374434 2.717973 
6:16:08  54 4 KneeLeft -0.110186 -0.5794815 2.658908 
6:16:08  54 4 AnkleLeft -0.105069 -0.8564035 2.591405 
6:16:08  54 4 FootLeft -0.1383674 -0.7525697 2.603314 
6:16:08  54 4 HipRight 0.1401658 -0.2364716 2.747092 
6:16:08  54 4 KneeRight 0.1786352 -0.5844484 2.649752 
6:16:08  54 4 AnkleRight 0.2345826 -0.8585159 2.609676 
6:16:08  54 4 FootRight 0.1733328 -0.8021312 2.610182 







SkeletonID  JointX  JointY  JointZ 
6:16:08  39 4 0.042094 -0.24195 2.662193 
6:16:08  54 4 0.046264 -0.2435 2.664862 
6:16:08  86 4 -0.15867 -0.27755 2.455804 
6:16:08  117 4 -0.14502 -0.27214 2.438134 
6:16:08  148 4 -0.12311 -0.2574 2.463184 
6:16:08  195 4 -0.09961 -0.25025 2.464329 
6:16:08  210 4 0.193052 -0.17576 2.686492 
6:16:08  242 4 0.222623 -0.17232 2.689159 
6:16:08  273 4 0.235105 -0.16601 2.694462 
6:16:08  320 4 0.252239 -0.16588 2.697867 
6:16:08  351 4 0.272886 -0.15219 2.703254 
6:16:08  382 4 0.28863 -0.149 2.707058 
6:16:08  429 4 0.313742 -0.14663 2.711317 
6:16:08  460 4 0.340276 -0.14295 2.718948 
6:16:08  491 4 0.377089 -0.13771 2.725929 
Figure 20. Sample Skeleton Output (15 frames) from the Kinesic Real Time 





The sample code below shows how the above Microsoft Kinect data can be 
collected for analysis.   
 














    class Program 
    { 
 
 
        static string jointDataOutputPath = ""; 
        static string skeletonDataOutputPath = ""; 
        
        static Runtime nui = new Runtime(); 
        static void Main(string[] args) 
        { 
            //get config settings 
            XmlTextReader reader = new 
XmlTextReader("KinectGetData.exe.config"); 
            XmlDocument xmlDoc = new XmlDocument(); 
            xmlDoc.Load(reader); 
            jointDataOutputPath = 
xmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("configuration/appSettings/JointDataOutputP
ath/text()").Value; 
            skeletonDataOutputPath = 
xmlDoc.SelectSingleNode("configuration/appSettings/SkeletonDataOutp
utPath/text()").Value;             
 
            //start recording kinect data 
            Thread kinectDataCaptureThread = new Thread(new 
ThreadStart(captureJointPoints)); 
            try 
            { 
     
                 
                using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new 
System.IO.StreamWriter(@jointDataOutputPath, true)) 
                { 




currently does not work properly; so says Microsoft. I left it out. 
                    file.WriteLine("Time, Millisecond, SkeletonID, 
JointID, JointX, JointY, JointZ"); 
                } 
                using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new 
System.IO.StreamWriter(@skeletonDataOutputPath, true)) 
                { 
                    //write to file: quality measure (joint.W) 
currently does not work properly; so says Microsoft. I left it out. 
                    file.WriteLine("Time, Millisecond, SkeletonID, 
JointX, JointY, JointZ"); 
                } 
            } 
            catch (System.IO.IOException) 
            { 
                System.Windows.MessageBox.Show("Error opening the 
file for Kinect Data export.\nMake sure the output files are not 
currently in use and restart the program."); 
            } 
            kinectDataCaptureThread.Start(); 
 
 
            Thread.Sleep(1000 * 180);//3 minutes: change to match 
experimental protocol 
 
            //TODO: shut down kinect data collection; save to file 
 
            kinectDataCaptureThread.Abort(); 
 
 
        } 
 
        static void startApplication(string directory, string 
filename) 
        { 
            System.IO.Directory.SetCurrentDirectory(directory); 
            Process p = new Process(); 
            p.StartInfo.FileName = filename; 
            //p.StartInfo.Arguments = ""; 
            p.Start(); 
        } 
 
 
        public static void captureJointPoints() 
        { 
 
            try 
            { 
                nui.Initialize(RuntimeOptions.UseSkeletalTracking); 
            } 
            catch (InvalidOperationException) 
            { 




initialization failed. Please make sure Kinect device is plugged 
in."); 
                return; 
            } 
 
            nui.SkeletonFrameReady += new 
EventHandler<SkeletonFrameReadyEventArgs>(nui_SkeletonFrameReady); 
            Thread.Sleep(1000);//needs time to initialize or it 
crashes for some reason. Hokey way to deal with this for now. 
        } 
 
        static void nui_SkeletonFrameReady(object sender, 
SkeletonFrameReadyEventArgs e) 
        { 
            SkeletonFrame skeletonFrame = e.SkeletonFrame; 
 
            int iSkeleton = 0; 
 
 
            foreach (SkeletonData data in skeletonFrame.Skeletons) 
            { 
                 
                if (SkeletonTrackingState.Tracked == 
data.TrackingState) 
                { 
                //capture overall center of mass for the skeleton 
                using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new 
System.IO.StreamWriter(@skeletonDataOutputPath, true)) 
                    file.WriteLine(DateTime.Now.ToLongTimeString() 
+ ","+ DateTime.Now.Millisecond  + "," + data.TrackingID +  
                        "," + data.Position.X + "," + 
data.Position.Y + "," + data.Position.Z); 
 
                    // Save joints 
 
 
                    foreach (Joint joint in data.Joints) 
                    { 
                        using (System.IO.StreamWriter file = new 
System.IO.StreamWriter(@jointDataOutputPath, true)) 
                            
file.WriteLine(DateTime.Now.ToLongTimeString() + "," + 
DateTime.Now.Millisecond + "," + data.TrackingID + ","  
                                 + joint.ID + "," + 
joint.Position.X + "," + joint.Position.Y + "," + joint.Position.Z 
                                 ); 
                         
                      //  Console.Out.Write(joint.ID + "," + 









                } 
                iSkeleton++; 
            } // for each skeleton 
 
 
        } 





C# project settings file 
 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<Project ToolsVersion="4.0" DefaultTargets="Build" 
xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/developer/msbuild/2003"> 
  <PropertyGroup> 
    <Configuration Condition=" '$(Configuration)' == '' 
">Debug</Configuration> 
    <Platform Condition=" '$(Platform)' == '' ">x86</Platform> 
    <ProductVersion>8.0.30703</ProductVersion> 
    <SchemaVersion>2.0</SchemaVersion> 
    <ProjectGuid>E10B9616-3C49-4399-81F6-157F524CB0E5</ProjectGuid> 
    <OutputType>Exe</OutputType> 
    <AppDesignerFolder>Properties</AppDesignerFolder> 
    <RootNamespace>KinectGetData</RootNamespace> 
    <AssemblyName>KinectGetData</AssemblyName> 
    <TargetFrameworkVersion>v4.0</TargetFrameworkVersion> 
    <TargetFrameworkProfile>Client</TargetFrameworkProfile> 
    <FileAlignment>512</FileAlignment> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' == 
'Debug|x86' "> 
    <PlatformTarget>x86</PlatformTarget> 
    <DebugSymbols>true</DebugSymbols> 
    <DebugType>full</DebugType> 
    <Optimize>false</Optimize> 
    <OutputPath>bin\Debug\</OutputPath> 
    <DefineConstants>DEBUG;TRACE</DefineConstants> 
    <ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport> 
    <WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel> 
  </PropertyGroup> 
  <PropertyGroup Condition=" '$(Configuration)|$(Platform)' == 
'Release|x86' "> 
    <PlatformTarget>x86</PlatformTarget> 
    <DebugType>pdbonly</DebugType> 
    <Optimize>true</Optimize> 
    <OutputPath>bin\Release\</OutputPath> 
    <DefineConstants>TRACE</DefineConstants> 
    <ErrorReport>prompt</ErrorReport> 
    <WarningLevel>4</WarningLevel> 




  <ItemGroup> 
    <Reference Include="Microsoft.Research.Kinect, Version=1.0.0.0, 
Culture=neutral, PublicKeyToken=31bf3856ad364e35, 
processorArchitecture=MSIL" /> 
    <Reference Include="PresentationFramework" /> 
    <Reference Include="System" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Core" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Windows.Forms" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Xml.Linq" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Data.DataSetExtensions" /> 
    <Reference Include="Microsoft.CSharp" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Data" /> 
    <Reference Include="System.Xml" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <Compile Include="Program.cs" /> 
    <Compile Include="Properties\AssemblyInfo.cs" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <ItemGroup> 
    <None Include="KinectGetData.exe.config" /> 
  </ItemGroup> 
  <Import Project="$(MSBuildToolsPath)\Microsoft.CSharp.targets" /> 
  <!-- To modify your build process, add your task inside one of 
the targets below and uncomment it.  
       Other similar extension points exist, see 
Microsoft.Common.targets. 
  <Target Name="BeforeBuild"> 
  </Target> 
  <Target Name="AfterBuild"> 
  </Target> 




<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> 
<configuration> 
   
  <appSettings> 
    
<JointDataOutputPath>C:\ScreeningExperiment2\KinectData\JointData.c
sv</JointDataOutputPath> 
    
<SkeletonDataOutputPath>C:\ScreeningExperiment2\KinectData\Skeleton
Data.csv</SkeletonDataOutputPath> 







12. APPENDIX C: EXPERIMENT 2 FACES CIT ANALYSIS 
Four of the five visual CIT questions for experiment two presented words as 
stimuli. As an exploratory measure a fifth CIT foil was added. This final foil was 
more visual in nature: four faces were presented on the screen, one of which would 
have been significant only to a participant in the Guilty condition. There was no 
individual baseline to compare with, but between subjects effects were determined 
for each day using logistic regression models that specified the presence of hidden 
guilty knowledge as the response variable. The logistic regression models for day 1 
and day 2 both produce a Nagelkerke R2 of .16 and a Cox & Snell R2 of .12.  Time 
spent gazing at the center of the screen was significant on day 1 but not day 2. The 
direction of the initial saccade was not significant. Response time was consistently 
predictive across both days. The results of these models are shown in the table 
below. 
  
Table 11. Results of Logistic Regression Models for Faces Visual CIT Foil 
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The model for day 1 produced an AUC of .70; the model for day produced an 
AUC of .72. ROC Curves for these models are displayed below.  
 
  
Day 1 Day 2 
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